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Are All Shares Equal? A Measure of Secondary Agency Conflict and an Examination of 
its Influence on Investor Reactions to Acquisition Announcements  
By: 
Christine Sutton 
The separation of ownership and control has been established as the source of primary 
agency conflict between managers and shareholders. The research presented in the 
chapters that follow explain how the combination of ownership and control also represent 
a significant problem for many dispersed shareholders. Prior research has argued that 
conflict among principals is pervasive in all types of corporations and may be detrimental 
to all the firm’s stakeholders. Scholars have investigated the relationships, but there 
existed no comprehensive and validated instrument to analyze the extent of the inequity 
among the various firm principals. In the following chapters, a composite measure that 
represents the various underlying theoretical constructs related to secondary agency 
theory is introduced and validated. The first and second chapters of the research 
document explain the theoretical basis of secondary agency conflict along with past 
measures employed. The validation process employed to create a Shareholder Inequity 
measure is described and a comprehensive index measuring the extent of inequity among 
firm owners is formulated. The third chapter explains the follow-up study involving a test 
of the newly created Shareholder Inequity measure; an event study of the market reaction 
to acquisition announcements by firms with inherent secondary agency problems. This 





differences that exist among shareholders that create opportunities to distort the process 
of returning wealth equitably to all firm owners. The second objective is to evaluate how 
investors perceived and reacted to the inequities when acquisition activity was 
announced; these are situations that are particularly prone to creating agency conflicts of 
various types. Objectives were met by explaining the dimensionality of secondary agency 
conflicts, validating measures for the dimensions, and confirming the significant 
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Jensen and Meckling (1976) defined agency relationships as contracts between 
persons (i.e., principals) who engage other persons (i.e., agents) to perform some service 
on their behalves. Since contracts are imperfect, conflicts and related costs may arise 
from the misalignment of goals between parties (Grossman & Hart, 1988). The associated 
costs only arise when the principal (owner) and the agent (manager) have divergent 
interests. When the owner is the sole decision maker for the firm, there are no agency 
costs (Ang, Cole, & Lin, 2000). Alternatively, as ownership becomes more diffused and 
distanced from management, agency conflicts arise (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). One 
proposed governance mechanism to minimize goal incongruence is concentrated 
ownership or blockholding (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). While blockholding may be 
effective in alleviating primary agency conflicts, secondary agency conflicts may emerge 
(Singla, Veliyath, & George, 2014). Shareholders or shareholder blocks maintain varying 
goals and interests (Bagwell, 1992) which may result in conflict when the goals are not 
aligned with other shareholders in an organization (Dharwadkar, George, & Brandes, 
2000). Goal incongruence becomes problematic when a shareholder or shareholder group 
exercises their control (arising primarily from their ownership but also sometimes from 




Ahlstrom, Bruton, & Jiang, 2008). Table 1 highlights several of the differences between 
primary agency and secondary agency1 conflicts.  
Table 1: Comparison of Common Primary and Secondary Agency Conflicts 
Primary Agency Secondary Agency 
Conflict between owner and manager Conflict among owners 
Stems from separation of ownership and 
control 
Stems from varied combinations of 
ownership and control  
Agent vs. Principal Principal vs. Principal 
Studied extensively in many countries and 
contexts for almost 40 years 
Studied sporadically in finance, most 
recently management studies are focused 
in Asian countries and/or family 
businesses 
Managers pursue their own self-interests 
Managers are influenced by the 
preferences of certain shareholders or 
shareholder groups 
Studied in all types of companies 
Studies to date are limited to firms with 
certain “types” of owners (e.g., family, 
institutional, and government)  
  
Agency relationships between owners and managers have been widely studied 
(e.g., Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen & Meckling, 1976), but the equally important relationship 
among firm principals is less researched. Secondary agency problems exist in many firms 
regardless of their ownership type, economic environment, or governance structures, but 
are most severe in areas with high ownership concentration and few legal protections for 
shareholders (Young et al., 2008). As a result, this conflict is most heavily studied in less 
developed countries that have government blockholders or owners with political power 
(Dharwadkar et al., 2000). However, these conflicts also occur and have been 
documented in areas with more sophisticated legal environments like Europe and North 
America (Renders & Gaeremynck, 2012; Villalonga & Amit, 2006). Often the conflicts 
                                                 
1The terms secondary agency (Singla, Veliyath, & George, 2014), type II agency (Villalonga & Amit, 
2006), and principal-principal agency (Dharwadkar, George, & Brandes, 2000) have been used 
interchangeably in the business literature to describe conflicts among firm principals. For convenience and 




are not blatant and obvious since the regulatory environments offer greater investor 
protections, but some firm decisions are irrational and motivations are clearly 
questionable (Young et al., 2008).  
A recent example of these questionable decisions that may stem from secondary 
agency conflict was the bidding war between the Tyson family, owners of Tyson Foods, 
Inc. and Pilgrim’s Pride for the acquisition of Hillshire Farms. Tyson Foods is the largest 
prepared foods provider and Hillshire Farms was the eleventh largest causing 
shareholders, competitors, activists, and even the Department of Justice concern. 
Regardless, the chairman of Tyson’s board of directors, John Tyson, explained in a press 
release that Tyson Foods has historically grown through strategic acquisitions and that 
the board of directors believe that the decision to acquire Hillshire Farms is a 
“transformational opportunity and best fits with our strategic plan while enhancing our 
margins and creating long-term shareholder value.” Market analysts were not convinced 
and downgraded Tyson’s stock explaining that Tyson was significantly overpaying at the 
price of 8.55 billion dollars and substantially increasing their debt levels to finance the 
cash acquisition. In fact, Tyson even sold off their operations in Mexico and Brazil to 
reduce the debt incurred to fund the acquisition choices (Baertlein, 2014). When 
Pilgrim’s Pride announced the withdrawal of its bid for Hillshire Farms, the Pilgrim’s 
Pride CEO explained, “as a disciplined acquirer, we determined that it was in the best 
interests of our shareholders not to increase our proposed price” (Bunge, 2014). Even 
more confusing was the fact that Tyson paid two billion dollars more than Pilgrim Pride’s 
last bid (Prior, 2014). While Tyson was engaged in this bidding war their stock 
plummeted more than 25%. During that same time period, Pilgrim’s Pride’s stock 




owns 99% of the Class B stock that has 10:1 voting rights over other shareholders) was 
willing to overpay and take on the additional debt when the actions have destroyed and 
will likely continue to destroy firm value (especially for their minority shareholders)?2 
Research presented here will provide possible explanations for the actions of firms like 
Tyson Foods that pursue inexplicable strategies that result in the destruction of 
shareholder value.  
As evidenced in the Tyson Foods example, secondary agency conflicts often 
destroy shareholder value. Therefore, continued research of the relationships among 
principals has been encouraged (Miller, Le Breton-Miller, & Lester, 2010; Morck, 
Wolfenzon, & Yeung, 2005; Young et al., 2008). In the first chapter of this dissertation, 
the objectives and motivations for the research are explained and the existing secondary 
agency studies are explored. In the second chapter, constructs that represent various 
theoretical aspects of secondary agency are developed and validated. Finally, in the third 
chapter, impacts of secondary agency problems in the context of firm acquisitions are 
examined and tested.    
1.2 OBJECTIVES AND MOTIVATIONS 
Secondary agency conflicts among firm principals have been documented in firms 
with various types of owners, such as families (Chrisman, Chua, & Litz, 2004; Villalonga 
& Amit, 2010), institutions (Cronqvist & Fahlenbrach, 2009), and governments (Chen & 
Young, 2010). Secondary agency problems are studied in both emerging (Young et al., 
2008) and developed economies (Renders & Gaeremynck, 2012). Additionally, the 
                                                 
2Family motivations may not have been the only concern for minority shareholders in this particular 
acquisition. Blackrock and Vanguard own more than 5% of both Tyson and Hillshire. Research shows that 
owners with cross-holdings may be indifferent to the destruction of wealth for acquiring shareholders since 
that wealth is transferred to the target and therefore does not affect the cross-holding blockholder’s overall 




conflicts among principals have been documented on several continents including Asia 
(e.g., Singla et al., 2014; Su, Xu, & Phan, 2008; Yoshikawa & Rasheed, 2010), Europe 
(e.g., Maury & Pajuste, 2002; Renders & Gaeremynck, 2012), and North America (e.g., 
Barclay & Holderness, 1989; Villalonga & Amit, 2009).  
Secondary agency problems among firm principals occur due to shareholder 
heterogeneity – the misalignment of goals and interests among principals (Bagwell, 1992) 
– and may result in poor strategic choices such as diversifying acquisitions (Miller et al., 
2010) or lower profitability from purchasing and selling goods at sub-optimal prices to 
cronies (Khanna & Rivkin, 2001). Cronyism or “mutual back scratching” represents a 
secondary agency problem when controlling owners choose business relationships that 
offer private benefits unavailable to all shareholders (Brick, Palmon, & Wald, 2006). 
Additionally, company growth may stagnate if controlling owners are entrenched or risk-
averse and do not pursue profitable opportunities (Miller, Le-Breton Miller, & Scholnick, 
2008). Further, since firm information is publicly available, investors recognize and 
account for secondary agency conflicts by demanding higher dividends (more cash) to 
offset the disadvantages of less control (Ferris, Kim, & Kitsabunnarat, 2003). The higher 
dividends result in greater costs of capital and lower firm valuations for firms with 
intense secondary agency problems (Faccio, Lang, & Young, 2001; Lins, 2003).  
While secondary agency conflicts are widely considered a problem for minority 
shareholders, the consequences of secondary agency problems extend to other 
stakeholders of a corporation as well. Secondary agency conflicts affect the employees of 
a corporation through practices such as nepotism (Chrisman et al., 2004). For example, 
family firms may hire or promote less qualified family members resulting in lower 




relationships with suppliers or distributors by purchasing supplies and materials at above-
market prices from organizations owned by, or associated with, controlling shareholders 
or by selling products and services at below-market prices to the same cronies (Khanna & 
Rivkin, 2001). Additionally, secondary agency problems may become a societal concern 
when power is so heavily concentrated that the financial markets are distorted and capital 
is allocated inefficiently in the economy (Morck et al., 2005). In the most severe 
instances concentrated control may extend into the political arena affecting the standard 
of living for all stakeholders (Young et al., 2008). Thus, identifying and measuring 
secondary agency problems is important for all stakeholders (including shareholders) of a 
corporation.  
The review of the literature on secondary agency problems presented in the next 
section, 1.3, identified that a wide range of disciplines recognize the conflicts and their 
consequences for corporate governance practices (Young et al., 2008). Kim, Kim, and 
Lee (2008) posit that some combination of outside investors, national governance, and 
firm-level governance could reduce the conflicts among principals. Firm value is tied to 
internal and external governance mechanisms (Brown & Caylor, 2006) and the various 
practices often substitute for one another (Rediker & Seth, 1995). The most efficient 
bundle of governance mechanisms may vary systemically at different levels and therefore 
some studies have investigated secondary agency conflict at the industry, state, or country 
level (Claessens, Djankov, Fan, & Lang, 2002; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & 
Vishny, 2000; Ward & Filatotchev, 2010). While recognition of the multi-level impacts 
and problems stemming from secondary issues is important, this study is limited to 
examining only firm level secondary agency problems. Country level measures of 




much insight into secondary agency costs occurring at the firm level (La Porta et al., 
2000). 
The absence of consistency in the definitions and measurement of secondary 
agency problems represents a gap in the governance literature. While researchers agree 
that conflicts among principals exist, the terminology and definitions vary. For example, 
Young et al. (2008, p. 196) explain that, “Principal–principal conflicts between 
controlling shareholders and minority shareholders result from concentrated ownership, 
extensive family ownership and control, business group structures, and weak legal 
protection of minority shareholders.” This definition is limiting since conflicts among 
principals exist in countries with a strong legal system as well (Barclay & Holderness, 
1992; Morck & Yeung, 2004; Renders & Gaeremynck, 2012). Alternatively, the extant 
literature on secondary agency issues defines the problem as, “the misalignment of goals 
among majority and minority shareholders that results in the expropriation of minority 
shareholders’ wealth” (Singla et al., 2014, p. 607).  In order to legitimize phenomena and 
constructs, a consistent definition is necessary (Short, Payne, & Ketchen, 2008). A 
consistent definition should reference the various dimensions of a construct so that 
antecedents and consequences may be more fully understood (Short, Moss, & Lumpkin, 
2009). In order to reference the various dimensions of secondary agency conflict, they 
must first be identified and empirically analyzed. Therefore, future governance studies 
would be strengthened by defining the various dimensions and consistently measuring the 
proposed constructs across multiple instances (Boyd, Gove, & Hitt, 2005). Additionally, 
consistent measurement of observed phenomena allows for comparisons across studies 
and facilitates theory development (Eisenhardt, 1989). Consequently, this essay surveys 




agency problems. Then, additional potential measures, that detect the scope and the 
domain of the conflict among principals, are suggested. Finally, building on theory and 
past literature, a valid and generalizable index of the extent of inequity among 
shareholders is constructed and tested. 
There have been a limited number of empirical studies on secondary agency 
problems and most of these studies used particular situations or proxy measures to show 
evidence of the issue. Proxies employed for secondary agency problems include 
ownership measures such as concentration and type (Dahya, Dimitrov, & McConnell, 
2008; Setia-Atmaja, Tanewski, & Skully, 2009) and board measures like compensation, 
size, and proportion of independent directors (Su et al., 2008). However, proxies provide 
researchers with relatively little assurance that an observed phenomenon is measured 
reliably (Boyd et al., 2005). Other streams of literature examined the extent of private 
benefits consumed by blockholders at the expense of minority shareholders by 
quantifying the premium paid for large-percentage blocks of shares (Barclay & 
Holderness, 1989) and comparing share prices of dual class shares (Zingales, 1995). 
Since large block trades are infrequent events and the majority of firms do not have 
multiple share classes (Zingales, 1995), these methods are often not applicable.  
Researchers have “strongly encouraged the application of more indexes and scales 
in strategic management research” (Boyd et al., 2005, p. 252). The literature review of 
secondary agency problems revealed that only one paper to date has employed any 
validated index to measure secondary agency problems (Renders & Gaeremynck, 2012).3 
The conflict index proposed by Renders and Gaeremynck (2012) was tested and applied 
at the country-level for European firms. Renders and Gaeremynck (2012, p.128) explain 
                                                 




that their measure includes “an extensive set of variables shown to be linked with the 
severity of agency problems.” They did not explain that secondary agency problems have 
different dimensions or that the neutrality of firm directors exacerbates the conflict. 
Instead, the authors noted that the various measures included had been used before 
independently and were now used in combination through a principal factor analysis that 
reduced five correlated measures into one factor, labeled conflict (Renders & 
Gaeremynck, 2012).  
In comparison, the present research studies the conflict at the firm level in the 
United States by identifying the various theoretically supportable dimensions of 
secondary agency conflict and incorporating multiple variables to represent each of the 
dimensions. New constructs that characterize the different dimensions were introduced, 
defined, and tested, including a construct representing the neutrality of the board of 
directors that was not addressed in Renders and Gaeremynck’s (2012) conflict measure. 
The constructs in this study were factor analyzed to create a theoretical measurement 
model. Once the measurement model was developed, a confirmatory factor analysis was 
performed to validate the proposed structure. The PLS-SEM testing provided a more 
detailed and comprehensive view of the relationships among the underlying dimensions 
in addition to the creation of a composite index of secondary agency problems.  
While the newly developed secondary agency constructs shall add value to many 
studies of strategic firm behavior, the first test of the measures was performed in the 
context of firm acquisitions through an event study (Brown & Warner, 1980), as shown 
in Chapter 3. Event studies offer researchers the opportunity to isolate and evaluate 
market reactions to announcements (Brown & Warner, 1985). Acquisitions are 




studied extensively in the context of primary agency conflicts (Eisenhardt, 1989; Tosi & 
Gomez-Mejia, 1989). When primary agency problems exist, investors in the acquiring 
firm often react negatively to announced acquisitions because they question the 
motivations for the decision since acquisitions often reduce value (Masulis, Wang, & 
Xie, 2007). Acquisition activities are also a suitable context for the study of secondary 
agency problems since this type of firm growth offers certain shareholders opportunities 
to enjoy benefits unavailable to other firm owners (Goranova, Dharwadkar, & Brandes, 
2010). Examples of these private benefits include personal portfolio diversification 
(Miller et al., 2010) and greater power and influence (Chen & Young, 2010). An event 
study of firm acquisition announcements offers an immediate and measureable reaction 
to the extent of secondary agency conflict in a firm. Negative investor reactions, captured 
by abnormal stock returns around the time of the announcement, provide evidence that 
minority shareholders believe that the controlling shareholders’ strategic choices will 
reduce firm value (Chen & Young, 2010). Since prior research has demonstrated that 
blockholders engage in strategies which advance personal, family, or political agendas at 
the expense of the firm (Denis & Sarin, 1999) and that the market accounts for the 
strategies (Paul, 2007; Schijven & Hitt, 2012), the event study was expected to provide 
further insights into secondary agency conflicts.  
A limited number of studies have explored problems among certain types of 
principals surrounding acquisition activities, but they do not encompass all facets of 
secondary agency problems (e.g., Chen & Young, 2010; Goranova et al., 2010; Miller et 
al., 2010). Ownership blockholdings that have been studied in acquisition contexts 
include family (Miller et al., 2010), institution (Goranova et al., 2010), and government 




secondary agency conflict, but the minority shareholders must also be considered to fully 
assess the magnitude of inequity among all firm owners. The selective sampling on the 
basis of ownership type has left a gap in secondary agency research. The following 
studies employed samples of publicly listed U.S. firms with varying ownership and 
control structures so that the findings are more generalizable. Additionally, the constructs 
offer a more complete picture of various secondary agency conflicts within firms since 
each underlying domain is explored and measured separately and in combination. 
Therefore, this research offers insights to both the governance and strategy research 
streams.  
 The remainder of the chapter provides a review of the theory and literature related 
to secondary agency problems.  
1.3 AGENCY LITERATURE REVIEW 
Agency problems were first identified by Jensen and Meckling (1976). The 
agency relationship is expressed as a contract between two entities that specifies the 
rights and both implicit and explicit behaviors expected of various interested parties 
within a firm. This nexus-of-contracts view, inspired by Coase (1937), includes 
employees, customers, suppliers, investors, governmental entities, as well as other 
stakeholders who provide some assets or resources in return for some expected gains. 
Stakeholder theory suggests that each of the individual explicit and implicit contracts 
should be recognized and fulfilled (Donaldson & Preston, 1995).  
From a purely economic perspective, the contracts would also be sufficient to 
protect minority shareholders. Theoretically, to reduce the cost of capital, those in control 
of firm decisions that are seeking capital would bind themselves to investors through 




1976; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). If the binding contracts were systematically enforced, no 
regulations would be required. However, in practice, the firm decision makers often do 
not create such contracts voluntarily, since the first order effect would be a reduction in 
expropriation opportunities that may be profitable for the decision makers. In many firms 
with dominant shareholders, owners bear the burden of managing the firm’s operations. 
The dominant shareholders (or groups) may rationalize the expropriation by considering 
it a “reimbursement” for the additional costs incurred. The value of the reimbursement to 
controlling shareholders is often referred to as the private benefits of control (Barclay & 
Holderness, 1989).  
Expropriation of firm value has consequences that may even extend to a nation’s 
economy (Morck et al., 2005). Therefore, laws are often established to protect minority 
shareholders by causing expropriation to be less convenient or efficient. As investor 
protection improves through legal means, expropriation becomes much more time-
consuming and costly. Therefore, blockholders would need to systematically engage in 
more challenging diversionary practices such as setting up intermediary companies into 
which they could channel profits (LaPorta et al., 2000). When investor protection laws 
are even more thorough and the board of directors is functioning as required by these 
laws, the most blockholders could accomplish is excessive perquisite consumption or 
undue influence over strategic decisions that may not be in the best interest of all 
shareholders. Additionally, blockholders may be fearful of future legal or financial 
consequences stemming from expropriation. Interpretations and expansions of the current 
laws may occur if the public or the court system perceives unfairness among owners 




is limited, since courts cannot account for all individual firm-level initiatives and 
variations (La Porta et al., 2000).   
While there is an ongoing debate among scholars concerning the purpose of a 
corporation (Stout, 2002) and the rights of stakeholders that are not owners (Donaldson & 
Preston, 1995), firms should treat all shareholders equally (Millon, 1990). Traditional 
agency solutions do not promote equitable treatment among shareholders (Dharwadkar et 
al., 2000). Managerial incentives and owner monitoring are much less effective when the 
conflicts are among the various principals. The shareholder conflicts often stem from the 
differing preferences and goals of the various owners and become problematic when the 
large shareholders abuse their ownership percentages to reap benefits unavailable to all 
shareholders.  
In the following sections the underlying areas of secondary agency problems are 
explored. The dimensions of secondary agency conflict were identified through an 
extensive review of relevant legal, finance, accounting, and management literatures. The 
goal of the literature review was to identify potential measures of the conflict among 
principals. Employing both key word searches (e.g., principal-principal, secondary 
agency, type II agency, agency cost measures, agency cost indices) and manual searches 
of leading journals (e.g., Strategic Management Journal, Journal of Finance, Journal of 
Management Studies, Journal of Management, Journal of Financial Economics, Journal 
of Law and Economics, American Economic Review, Academy of Management Journal, 
Academy of Management Review, Journal of Corporate Finance, Journal of Accounting 
and Economics), potentially relevant research was compiled for review. The review 




Each theoretical component associated with secondary agency conflict is presented in 
table form (Tables 2-5) and then further explained in the following section. 
1.3.1 Organizational Slack and Secondary Agency Conflict 
Table 2: Theoretical Basis for the Organizational Slack Construct  
Author(s) Relevant Major Findings 
Bagwell (1992) 
Shareholders are heterogeneous and therefore prefer 
different allocations of a firm’s slack resources. 
Barclay & Holderness 
(1989) 
Block trades are priced at a premium, especially for firms 
with large cash holdings. 
Bushee (1998) 
Bushee & Noe (2000) 
Different investors prefer different levels of R&D and 
pressure managers to comply with their preferences. 
Cyert & March (1963) 
Organizational slack was introduced and defined as the 
difference between available and committed resources. 
Daniel et al. (2004) The slack-performance relationship varies by industry. 
Edmans (2013) Excess cash allows for more efficient expropriation. 
Faccio et al. (2001) 
Dividend payouts limit expropriation because they remove 
corporate wealth from the control of the majority 
shareholder.  
Gugler & Yurtoglu (2003) 
Dividends signal the severity of the conflict between the 
large controlling owners and the small outside owners. 
Hill & Snell (1988) 
There exists a positive relationship between the level of 
stock concentration and R&D investments for U.S. firms 
due to lower information asymmetry. 
Jensen (1986) Organizational slack is harmful from an agency 
perspective. 
Kim et al. (2008) 
Distinguishing among different owners is instrumental in 
enhancing understanding of the relationship between 
financial slack and R&D investments. 
La Porta et al. (2000) 
Minority shareholders can protect their interests by 
demanding cash payouts (dividends). 
Lee & O'Neil (2003) 
The expectations of investors, their concern with stock 
prices, and their holding periods can affect R&D 
investments. 
Maury & Pajuste (2002) 
Outside shareholders often prefer dividends over retained 
earnings. 
Zahra & Filatotchev 
(2004) 
Information asymmetry complicates the relationship 
between ownership and R&D. 
         
Table 2 summarizes various contributions to establishing the theoretical links 
between preferences concerning the allocation of slack resources and secondary agency 




Cyert and March (1963), slack is the difference between the resources available to the 
organization and the payments required to maintain the organization. Past studies have 
explained the benefits of slack resources; such as greater autonomy and flexibility 
(Daniel, Lohrke, Fornaciari, & Turner, 2004) and the presence of a “safety net” for 
unexpected threats (Cyert & March, 1963); but too much slack breeds inefficiency, 
inhibits risk taking, and hurts performance (Jensen, 1986). From an agency theoretic 
perspective, slack is the source of agency problems and no governance would be 
necessary but for the existence of slack resources (Castaner & Kavadis, 2013). Therefore, 
while exploring the differing preferences for slack resources as a source of secondary 
agency conflict, the concern is not centered around the ideal level of slack for a firm, but 
instead how to allocate slack in an equitable way for all shareholders in the organization. 
Bourgeois and Singh (1983) explained that slack may be categorized as available (e.g., 
excess liquidity), recoverable (e.g., overhead expenditures) or potential (e.g., borrowing 
capacity) slack. While shareholders maintain differing preferences for all types of slack 
resources, available slack, also known as unabsorbed slack, will be the focus in the 
present research since it is the type most often measured in agency theoretic studies due 
to its highly discretionary nature (Kim et al., 2008).  
Shareholders are heterogeneous in their goals for their investment in a firm 
(Bagwell, 1992) and therefore maintain different preferences concerning the allocation of 
slack resources. Organizational Slack preferences vary because shareholders maintain 
different risk profiles, term orientations, and financial goals for their association with the 
organization (Fiss & Zajac, 2004). Some shareholders may also have the power to 
influence or control firm strategy, as explained in subsequent sections, but secondary 




resources (Singla et al., 2014). Relevant and differing preferences for slack resources that 
have been identified in secondary agency conflict studies are dividend payout ratios 
(Renders & Gaeremynck, 2012), research and development intensity (Kim et al., 2008), 
and financial slack levels (Kim et al., 2008). Further explanations and examples of each 
preference are provided in the following paragraphs.  
Several studies documented a negative relationship between blockholding and 
dividend payout ratios (Faccio et al., 2001; La Porta et al., 2000; Maury & Pajuste, 2002). 
The findings suggest that higher dividend payouts limit expropriation because dividends 
remove corporate wealth from the control of the large shareholders (Faccio et al., 2001). 
As a consequence, minority shareholders may have a preference for dividends over 
retained earnings. When no vigilant oversight or recourse exists, large shareholders may 
exploit minority shareholders’ portion of the firm’s undistributed wealth by stealing or re-
allocating profits (La Porta et al., 2000). Therefore, minority shareholders in high 
protection countries can protect their interests by demanding cash distributions (La Porta 
et al., 2000). Consistent with this argument, Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003) found evidence 
that the relationship between dividend reduction announcements and negative stock price 
reactions was intensified among companies in which the ownership and control structures 
made the expropriation of minority shareholder’s interests more likely.  
Research and development (R&D) is an integral but risky component of corporate 
strategy. Originally, under primary agency theory, a positive relationship was found to 
exist between the level of stock concentration and R&D investments (Hill & Snell, 1988). 
But, shareholders are heterogeneous with varying risk profiles and differing preferences 
for the intensity and scope of research and development initiatives. For instance, 




meet short-term earnings goals whereas the opposite is true for “dedicated” institutional 
owners (Bushee, 1998). Ownership pressure may cause firms to shift their strategic goals 
to align with certain shareholder’s expectations for holding period returns (Bushee & 
Noe, 2000; Lee & O’Neil, 2003). In one test of conflicting preferences, evidence was 
provided that family ownership moderates the relationship between slack resources and 
R&D investment differently than institutional or foreign ownership (Kim et al., 2008). 
Therefore, differing shareholder preferences may influence strategic R&D investment 
decisions in ways that are not necessarily in the best interest of all shareholders. 
A separate but relevant reason for conflicts regarding R&D priorities stems from 
information asymmetry among shareholders. Some controlling owners may be hesitant to 
trust and share sensitive information about research and development with professional 
managers and outside investors to protect firm-specific knowledge about capabilities and 
processes from competitors (Zahra & Filatotchev, 2004). Information asymmetry 
concerning the value of a project may lead to differing shareholder perceptions. 
Inefficient uses of limited resources (even when the inefficiency is only perceived) may 
lead to conflicts among shareholders that result in the destruction of value. 
Agency theory predicts negative repercussions for shareholders when firms have 
excess financial slack since these assets are highly discretionary (Jensen, 1986). In early 
studies, Barclay and Holderness (1989) documented premium pricing for negotiated 
block trades. The premium pricing reflected the private benefits of control from holding 
large blocks of a firm’s equity. Block trades that involved firms with larger amounts of 
discretionary slack were associated with higher premiums. Edmans (2013) suggests these 
findings offer evidence that retaining discretionary slack is an efficient way to 




tolerances and preferences among shareholders concerning the levels of discretionary 
cash holdings (Bagwell, 1992), slack is most equitably allocated when paid out to 
shareholders in the form of dividend since expropriation is not possible when slack does 
not exist (Faccio et al., 2001). However, while each shareholder may have heterogeneous 
preferences for cash flows, they can only influence policy if they hold enough power 
(Cronqvist & Fahlenbrach, 2009). One way that owners achieve the necessary power is 
through block ownership as summarized in Table 3 and further explained in the following 
section. 
1.3.2 Blockholder Power and Secondary Agency Conflict 
Table 3: Theoretical Basis for the Blockholder Power Construct 
Author(s) Relevant Major Findings 
Barclay & Holderness 
(1989) 
Significant private benefits of control are obtained 
through block trade pricing. 
Barclay & Holderness 
(1992) 
Private benefit consumption drives the decision to hold 
blocks of stock. 
Bushee (2004) 
Firms may choose strategies to recruit specific 
blockholders. 
Cronqvist & Fahlenbrach 
(2009)  
Some investors choose firms with specific traits while 
others attempt to influence firms to align with their 
preferences. 
Cronqvist & Nilsson 
(2003) 
Controlling shareholders set strategy, appoint board 
members, and have opportunities to extract wealth.  
Gugler & Yurtoglu (2003) A second blockholder increases monitoring. 
Maury & Pajuste (2002), 
(2005) 
The number of large blockholders in a firm may explain 
the choice majority owners make between adopting a 
monitoring or colluding role. 
 
Shareholder preferences for slack have been shown to be related to block 
ownership in multiple ways. Research suggests that ownership is not just a driver of 
strategy; instead it is also an outcome of strategic choices. For example, Bushee (2004) 
shows evidence of executives choosing strategies to attract certain blockholders. 
Research also found that investors may systematically select investments with certain 




Fahlenbrach, 2009). While monitoring and activism may create additional value for 
shareholders, it may also allow blockholders to pursue private benefits. Therefore 
minority shareholders experience a trade-off and the net benefit (loss) for minority 
shareholders varies (Tribo, Berrone, & Surroca, 2007). In situations where a dominant 
shareholder influences policy to create benefits unavailable to all owners, a secondary 
agency problem exists. 
Secondary agency problems become most pronounced when ownership is 
concentrated and that powerful individual or group also controls the strategic direction of 
a firm (Singla et al., 2014). The additional rewards for concentrated ownership in blocks, 
also called private benefits of control, are the financial and non-financial gains that large 
shareholders beget, through their decision making power, at the expense of small 
shareholders (Barclay & Holderness, 1989). Misappropriation of minority shareholders’ 
rights represents an important secondary agency problem among principals. It conflicts 
with a central premise of modern financial theory that each shareholder receives benefits 
in proportion to their ownership concentration (Jensen & Warner, 1988). Barclay and 
Holderness (1989) theorized that the value of private benefits of voting control is best 
measured by analyzing the pricing of block trades as represented by the exchange prices 
when compared to the market value. The authors found a discrepancy of 20% between 
the block trades and exchange pricing. The value of the significant divergence 
represented the extent of private benefits of control stemming from ownership 
concentration, and is therefore a secondary agency problem.  
Blockholders have an incentive to improve firm management and therefore 
increase the value of all shares, while at the same time consuming corporate resources to 




private benefits of control explain the decision to purchase blocks of ownership. 
Similarly, controlling shareholders face a cost-benefit analysis when deciding whether to 
collude with other blockholders, whether to monitor or whether to remain passive. When 
there is only a single large shareholder or shareholding group, the blockholders have the 
ability to determine the firm’s strategy, appoint board members, and extract wealth 
(Cronqvist & Nilsson, 2003). There exist mixed findings related to firm value in the 
presence of a second large shareholder, thus demonstrating the potential either for greater 
monitoring (Gugler & Yurtoglu, 2003) or for colluding (Maury & Pajuste, 2002). 
However, Maury and Pajuste (2005) confirm a positive relationship with firm value in the 
presence of a third strong blockholder. In a model with a third blockholder, the marginal 
costs are higher than the marginal benefits from the expropriation of minority 
shareholders and the diversion of resources is less efficient (and therefore more costly) 
for the first two blockholders (Maury & Pajuste, 2005).  
Blockholding is a source of power, but ownership has greater influence when it is 
combined with control (Cronqvist & Fahlenbrach, 2009; Singla et al., 2014). Owners who 
are not directly involved as managers or directors in the firm must find different ways, 
like for example shareholder activism, to exert control in order to extract private benefits 
(Smith, 1996). Alternatively, blockholders may be directly involved in firm management 
or they may serve on the board of directors (Holderness, 2003). These blockholders may 
more easily extract private benefits and influence strategy since they are directly involved 
in firm decisions and therefore maintain both ownership and control (Hoi & Robin, 
2010). The sources of control are summarized in Table 4 and further explored in the 





1.3.3 Differential Control and Secondary Agency Conflict 
Table 4: Theoretical Basis for the Differential Control Construct 
Author(s) Relevant Major Findings 
Bebchuk (1999)  
When private benefits of control are large, founders 
will retain control through dual class shares when they 
take their firms public. 
Dharwadkar et al. (2000) 
The board of directors is easily circumvented when 
ownership and managerial control are combined. 
Faccio & Lang (2002) 
Dual class share structures have detrimental effects at 
the country level as well. 
Grossman & Hart (1988);  
Harris & Raviv (1988)    
Firms that have dual class shares are undervalued. 
Hoi & Robin (2010) 
Firm value is reduced when controlling owners are 
close to managers. 
Jensen & Warner (1988) 
Any departure from “one share-one vote” may affect 
the wealth of all shareholders. 
Lin, Ma, Malatesta, & 
Xuan (2011) 
Control wedge has significant economic consequences 
(costs of debt) for all shareholders. 
Renders & Gaeremynck 
(2012) 
Dual class shares and the control wedge created 
represent the extent of conflict among shareholders. 
Shleifer & Wolfenzon 
(2002)  
When a controlling shareholder has a low cash flow 
stake, the cost of capital to the firm is high since other 
investors anticipate expropriation and pay depressed 
prices for any securities that the firm sells. 
 
The third theoretical area of secondary agency conflict explains the differential 
controls among owners and is summarized in Table 4. As described in the preceding 
section, some blockholders are limited in their ability to influence strategy without 
support from managers and board members. Alternatively, when owners are also 
managers or directors they have disproportionate control for their ownership stake 
(Renders & Gaeremynck, 2012). Often, research that explores secondary agency conflict 
finds increased effects when ownership and control are combined (Singla et al., 2014). 
For example, Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach (2009) document greater blockholder influence 
on firm mergers and acquisitions (M&A), dividends, and executive compensation 
policies when the blockholder is also a board member or an officer in the firm. The 




and management, also affects firm value (Hoi & Robin, 2010). Additionally, the agents 
(top managers) may also represent the controlling shareholders, and therefore they could 
circumvent monitoring by the boards of directors (Dharwadkar et al., 2000). 
An additional source of differential control is a dual class equity structure. 
Typically, a dual class share structure includes a publicly traded “inferior” class of stock 
that allows for one vote per share and a non-publicly traded “superior” class of stock with 
greater voting rights per share (Gompers, Ishii, & Metrick, 2010). Research has shown 
this share structure to be more prevalent when private benefits are high and the related 
perceived costs are low (Shleifer & Wolfenzon, 2002; Gompers et al., 2010). Jensen and 
Warner (1988) examined how patterns of stock ownership can influence firm value and 
efficiency. The authors argued that any departure from “one share-one vote” may affect 
the wealth of all shareholders. The problem of undervaluation of firms with dual class 
shares, a security design that offers different shares with distinct voting rights and 
dividend payments, has been confirmed empirically (Grossman & Hart, 1988; Harris & 
Raviv, 1988). Additionally, Faccio and Lang (2002) found that shareholder conflict is 
intensified when voting and cash flow rights are separated. A separation of voting and 
cash flow rights is detrimental to all shareholders since the wedge between control and 
cash flow signals expropriation opportunities for investors, and therefore depresses share 
prices (Shleifer & Wolfenzon, 2002).  
While the existence of dual class shares signals conflict among shareholders, the 
size of the wedge between the cash flow rights and the voting rights of blockholders is 
also economically significant (Lin, Ma, Malatesta, & Xuan, 2011). Research indicates an 
increase in secondary agency conflict when the largest shareholder’s voting rights exceed 




“the larger the voting rights of the largest shareholder, the greater is his ability to extract 
wealth from the company; the lower his cash flow rights, the lower are the costs he incurs 
from extracting wealth from the company.” Consequently, both the existence of dual 
class shares and the size of the wedge created signal potential expropriation opportunities 
and therefore represent the presence of secondary agency conflicts within a firm.  
Shareholders of a corporation rely on the board of directors to identify the 
problems and control expropriation within the firm by monitoring firm choices 
(Anderson & Reeb, 2004). Board members may have special interests that interfere with 
their objectivity in monitoring as summarized in Table 5 and further explained in the 
following section. 
1.3.4 Absence of Board Neutrality and Secondary Agency Conflict 
Table 5: Theoretical Basis for the Absence of Board Neutrality Construct 
Author(s) Relevant Major Findings 
Anderson & Reeb (2004) 
Independent directors may represent an important line of 
defense that minority shareholders can employ in 
protecting themselves against opportunism by large 
shareholders.  
Blair & Stout (1999) 
Directors in public firms have discretion to honor various 
owner preferences. 
Cronqvist & Fahlenbrach 
(2009) 
Blockholders have a greater influence on strategy when 
they also are officers or board members. 
Dahya et al. (2008) 
Dominant shareholders could raise the value of their 
firms by appointing more independent boards. 
Deutsch, Keil, & 
Laamanen  
(2011) 
Directors are powerful and have their own motivations 
for serving on a board of directors. 
Hoskisson, Hitt, Johnson, 
& Grossman (2002) 
Ownership representation on the board drives innovation 
strategy. 
Ravasi & Zattoni (2006) 
Owners and their representatives on the board drive or at 
least modify strategy and conflict. 
Setia-Atmaja et al. (2009) 
Board independence enhances firm value and the 
performance impact of board independence is stronger in 
closely-held firms and/or firms having low dividend 
payouts. 
Young et al. (2008) 
Controlling shareholders can decide who is on the board 
of directors. This effectively nullifies a board’s ability to 




 Another source of inequity stems from the composition of the board of directors. 
Shareholders that have disproportionate control may have the ability to suggest or even 
determine board members (Young et al., 2008). While board representation does not 
assure control over the entire board, owners serving on the board themselves or placing a 
delegate on the board may strengthen their influence on firm strategy. Both the 
composition of a firm’s board of directors and the concentration of power in top 
management have been recognized and studied as primary agency problems (Aggarwal, 
Erel, Stulz, & Williamson, 2010; Gompers, Ishii, & Metrick, 2003). In addition, within 
some types of ownership structures such as family controlled firms, research has also 
begun to empirically examine board composition in a secondary agency context 
(Anderson & Reeb, 2004; Setia-Atmaja et al., 2009).  
One source of concern is the concentration of power in the firm’s CEO. The 
concentration is frequently termed duality in the primary agency literature and describes 
situations when the CEO is also the chairman of the board (Boyd, 1995). Since secondary 
agency problems focus on conflict among owners, the concentration of power is 
expanded to include a third source of influence in the form of blockholding. From a 
secondary agency perspective, a blockholding CEO may have fewer opportunities to 
expropriate wealth when an independent chair is monitoring the CEO’s activity (Singla et 
al., 2014). In an empirical test of various blockholder combinations, Sacristán-Navarro, 
Gómez-Ansón, & Cabeza-García (2011) found reduced profitability for firms with family 
blockholders as the CEO or chairman. Additionally, concentration of ownership in 
management and on boards has been shown to misalign the risk preferences of various 
categories of owners. For example, manager-blockholders pursue international 




frequently (Alessandri & Seth, 2014) and business diversification, which is often less 
profitable for shareholders with diverse portfolios, more frequently (Miller et al., 2010).  
Expropriation of value by blockholders may also occur through influencing board 
composition decisions. In extreme cases, controlling shareholders can determine the 
entire board of directors, effectively nullifying a board’s ability to oversee those 
shareholders (Young et al., 2008). More frequently, large shareholders may have one or 
more board members that represent their particular interests in the firm (Ravasi & 
Zattoni, 2006). Additionally, directors of publicly listed firms have an “extraordinary 
degree of discretion to pursue other agendas and to favor other constituencies” (Blair & 
Stout, 1999, p. 252). 
Like dual class shares, a lack of board neutrality may create expropriation 
concerns for minority shareholders. Prior research explains that outside directors are 
“powerful individuals, present or former CEOs, representatives of institutional 
blockholders, or top professionals that have their own individual motives as members of 
the board” (Deutsch, Keil, & Laamanen, 2011, p. 211). Ravasi and Zattoni (2006) 
examined a political perspective of board behavior in a qualitative study and found that 
the heterogeneous interests of various shareholder representatives often drove or 
modified proposed strategies, accounting for the majority of board conflict.  
Board independence, usually a theoretical component of primary agency, has been 
modified and studied in a secondary agency framework. For example, Setia-Atmaja et al. 
(2009) studied family firms and confirmed that board independence enhances firm value 
and that the enhancement effect is stronger in firms that are more prone to secondary 
agency conflicts. Board independence in Setia-Atmaja et al.’s (2009) study referred to 




employed primary agency measure of board independence from management. 
Additionally, empirical research established that dominant shareholders could raise the 
value of their firms by appointing “strong” boards to signal a commitment to refraining 
from expropriation (Dahya et al., 2008). Another study included a three-tier system of 
independence (independent, affiliated, or insiders) from the controlling family (Anderson 
& Reeb, 2004). Independent directors had no identifiable or disclosed relationships with 
the controlling blocks. Affiliated directors had business relationships while the insider 
category included family members and firm employees. Their research showed that 
directors not affiliated with the family represented an important line of defense that 
minority shareholders could employ to gain power relative to family shareholders to 
protect their interests (Anderson & Reeb, 2004). Regardless of the nomenclature 
employed (i.e., independent, strong, unaffiliated), it is clear that the neutrality (or lack 
thereof) of the firm’s directors in the consideration of all shareholders’ interests may also 
serve as a significant indicator of the extent of secondary agency conflict within a firm. 
1.4 CONCLUSION 
Renders and Gaeremynck (2012) sought to advance secondary agency literature 
by creating an index for the measurement of secondary agency problems. Their measure 
built on existing theory and their findings employing the index indicated the existence of 
secondary agency conflicts in their sample of firms. Their index was termed a conflict 
index and included the percentage of voting shares held by the largest shareholder as well 
as the holdings of the second largest shareholder, a dummy variable for dual class shares, 
a dummy variable for the blockholder voting/cash flow rights, and the percentage of 
dividends paid. The measure developed in Chapter 2 includes indicators from Renders 




more representative of the complex underlying theoretical domains of secondary agency 
problems discussed in the preceding sections.   
Thus, the next chapter in this dissertation focuses on the development of 
constructs that represent the dimensions of secondary agency problems. Each component 
of shareholder conflict will be defined and motivated by the relevant literature. As 
explained in the next chapter, varying preferences for the allocation of slack resources 
combined with ownership blocks, control, and a board that is not neutral is inequitable for 
minority shareholders and results in destruction of firm value. Factor analysis will be 
used to group the constituent variables, employed in prior literature as proxies or 
measures of the severity of secondary agency conflicts, into first order constructs. Then, 
using second order confirmatory factor analysis, the first order reflective constructs will 
be refined and validated into a single formative measure of Shareholder Inequity. The 
resulting Shareholder Inequity construct will be a combination of the underlying 
theoretical domains of secondary agency conflict that have been identified in prior 
research and witnessed in the strategic choices of publicly listed corporations. 
After the Shareholder Inequity construct is created in Chapter 2, the new measure 
will be employed in Chapter 3 to test investor perceptions of secondary agency problems 
manifested in the acquisition decisions of publicly listed companies in the United States. 
Acquisition activity has been studied extensively in the literature, but with inconclusive 
results (e.g., Agrawal & Jaffe, 2003; Bae, Kang, & Kim, 2002; Brauer, 2006; Carper, 
1990). Secondary agency conflict was found to account for and explain some of the 
observed variations in shareholder value maximization (or value destruction) that 




conflicting shareholder motivations influence strategic choices resulting in destruction of 
shareholder wealth.  
Prior studies of conflict among firm principals and acquisition activity have 
focused on the motivations of particular types of blockholders. For instance, Chen and 
Young (2010) studied Chinese government owners, Goranova et al. (2010) studied 
institutional owners and Miller et al. (2010) studied family owners in an acquisition 
context. The research presented in Chapter 3 explains the relationships between 
cumulative abnormal returns (CAR),4 representative of investor reactions to the strategic 
decision, and each underlying theoretical area of secondary agency problems (i.e., 
Organizational Slack, Blockholder Power, Differential Control, and Absence of Board 
Neutrality). In addition, the relationships between secondary agency conflicts and 
diversifying acquisitions were explored. The goal of the acquisition announcement event 
study was to obtain a more robust view of the equitability of returns accruing to firm 
shareholders in the context of firm acquisitions. This goal was achieved as explained in 
Chapter 3. 
                                                 
4 Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) represent the market reaction that is different from the normal 
market trend for a particular firm. The abnormal stock return is recorded each day surrounding a particular 






2.1 PAPER ONE ABSTRACT 
The following chapter continues the exploration of the dimensions and past 
measurements of secondary agency conflicts among principals in a firm. First, the 
underlying theoretical areas (Organizational Slack, Blockholder Power, Differential 
Control, and Absence of Board Neutrality) of secondary agency problems identified in 
Chapter 1 are discussed further and specific measures for each of the areas are defined 
and explained. Then, a theoretically based second order model is introduced and tested 
for significance, validity, and reliability. The results of the PLS-SEM testing provide 
evidence that the theoretical dimensions of secondary agency problems have been 
correctly identified in the Shareholder Inequity model. The new model provides a 
comprehensive and appropriate measure of secondary agency problems and the 
underlying dimensions so that future governance studies have the ability to incorporate 






2.2 SPECIFIC MEASUREMENT LITERATURE REVIEW 
Publicly traded corporations are unique legal entities that are owned by a variety 
of shareholders with many different goals for their investments in the corporation 
(Bagwell, 1992). The various ownership positions may include individual shareholders or 
shareholder blocks that contain family members, employees (i.e., insiders), other 
corporations, banks/mutual funds, or other types of interest groups (Cronqvist & 
Fahlenbrach, 2009). Each block and even each shareholder may have different objectives 
that can sometimes be conflicting. The conflict affects firm value when minority 
shareholders believe that other shareholders with disproportionate control are 
expropriating the firm’s wealth (Hoskisson et al., 2002). The conflicts have been 
substantiated theoretically and empirically, but the extent of the inequity among 
shareholders has not been measured in a systematic way across disciplines. The following 
section identifies the different ways that these conflicts have been measured in the prior 
literature, differentiates between measures of primary and secondary agency problems, 
and discusses the improvements over past measurements that this study identifies. 
Primary agency problems have been measured in many ways. Research identifies 
primary agency problems with proxies like cash levels relative to the industry (Leary & 
Roberts, 2010), Tobin’s Q (Leary & Roberts, 2010), selling and general administrative 
costs/sales (Singh & Davidson, 2003), the ratio of total debt to total assets and the 
percentage of shares held by officers and directors (Krishnan & Ye, 2005). Additionally, 
Ang, Cole, and Lin (2000) used a measure of direct agency costs, calculated as the 
difference in dollar expenses between a firm with less than 100% owner-management and 
a firm with 100% owner-management (standardized by annual sales) to capture perquisite 




to identify primary agency costs (Aggarwal et al., 2010; Brown & Caylor, 2006; Durnev 
& Kim, 2005; Gompers et al., 2003; Klapper & Love, 2004). Both theoretically and 
empirically, each of the primary agency studies has provided evidence of conflicts 
between owners and managers.  
In order to reduce primary agency conflict, firms began to provide ownership 
stakes to managers in an attempt to align the goals of both managers and shareholders 
and to maximize shareholder wealth (Ofek & Yermack, 2000). However, the benefits 
gained from incurring these costs varied since all shareholders do not maintain identical 
utility and risk preferences (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 
1998). Additionally, new conflicts emerged from creating ownership groups that (due to 
their privileged positions) now had disproportionate control over firm resources. As 
compared to primary agency costs, differing shareholder preferences are the basis of 
secondary agency conflict and can be problematic for all stakeholders in an organization. 
Measurement of secondary agency conflicts has been inconsistent in the literature to date.  
Research has measured the extent of private benefit consumption by comparing 
block trade pricing and market pricing (Barclay & Holderness, 1989) or comparing 
market prices of different share classes (Zingales, 1995). Other research has measured 
secondary agency problems through ownership proxies (Dahya et al. 2008; Setia-Atmaja 
et al., 2009) or through the proportion of independent directors (Su et al., 2008). 
Additionally, dividend policy and other organizational slack strategies have been 
considered in measuring secondary agency conflicts (Kim et al., 2008; La Porta et al., 
2000). The presence of dual class shares has also been employed to empirically examine 




2012). Each of the proxies identifies one aspect of conflict among principals in a firm, 
but not the complete domain of secondary agency conflict.  
A recent study employed an index that gauges the extent of conflict among 
principals (Renders & Gaeremynck, 2012). Their index contained measures for 
percentage of voting shares held by the largest shareholder, a dividend payout ratio, 
dummy variables for a second blockholder, whether the voting rights of the largest 
shareholder exceeded their cash flow rights by more than 10%, and the presence of dual 
class shares. The index included variables that increased the majority shareholders’ 
ability to extract private benefits. The authors used factor analysis to confirm that all 
these related variables loaded on a single factor, which they labeled conflict. Renders and 
Gaeremynck’s (2012) conflict index was a first step towards developing a more 
comprehensive measure of secondary agency problems, but their study had some 
limitations. First, the conflict among principals was only measured when a blockholder 
owned 20% or more of the firm, otherwise the firm was reported to have no conflict. 
Since research explains that blockholders with 5% ownership are often influential on firm 
decisions (Villalonga & Amit, 2010), many blockholders are excluded in the construction 
of the conflict index (Renders & Gaeremynck, 2012). The sample for the research at hand 
includes and measures secondary agency problems in firms with smaller blockholders as 
well. Second, Renders and Gaeremynck (2012) aggregated the individual firm conflict at 
the country level for validation and testing. Since aggregation at the country level reduces 
variation and generalizability (La Porta et al., 2000), the measure developed in this study 
is not aggregated and therefore provides greater insights into the conflict at the firm level. 




all the identified dimensions of secondary agency conflict and no confirmatory factor 
analysis was performed to assess the validity of the unidimensional structure.  
The present research improves Renders and Gaeremynck’s (2012) measure by 
including a more comprehensive set of representative variables based on theory and 
employing confirmatory factor analysis to ensure validity and reliability of the derived 
construct. Studies examining block trade premiums have been limited by sample size 
since they are infrequent events (Barclay & Holderness, 1989), while studies examining 
dual class share pricing may experience a selection bias since only a fraction of firms 
employ these securities (Zingales, 1995). Other measures such as ownership type, 
percentage of shares owned, board measures, and free cash flow variables are limiting 
since theoretically they only represent a portion of the secondary agency construct. 
Therefore, in isolation they may not be sufficient for secondary agency problems to arise. 
The measure of inequity among shareholders presented in this chapter represents the 
secondary agency conflict within a firm by examining the combination of slack 
preferences, ownership and control structures, and board composition of a firm. The 
measure will provide a consistent tool for researchers to assess the secondary agency 
conflict that exists in many firms.  
2.3 CONSTRUCT DEVELOPMENT 
Shareholder Inequity is a formative measure that combines four underlying 
reflective constructs.5 Each of the underlying constructs contains variables that reflect the 
nature of the presented theoretical construct and many have been shown to represent 
secondary agency conflicts in related literature. The Shareholder Inequity construct 
represents the magnitude of inequality among shareholders in a firm. The theoretical 
                                                 
5 A more detailed discussion of formative and reflective measures will be provided in the Methodology 




basis for each construct was explained in Chapter 1 and summarized in Tables 2 through 
5. The related construct, justifications, directionality, and data source(s) for each of the 




















                                                 
6 Please note that some references from Tables 2 through 5 were more theoretical in nature and have been 




Table 6: Construct Labels, Measures, Impact on Shareholder Inequity, References, and 
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2.3.1 Organizational Slack Measures 
Organizational slack has been defined as the available resources remaining after 
all the firm’s commitments are funded (Cyert & March, 1963). The theoretical basis of 
the construct was explored in Chapter 1 and summarized in Table 2. Each Organizational 
Slack measure summarized in Table 6 reflects an opportunity for some owners to invest 
firm resources in a way that does not maximize the wealth of all owners. Differing 
preferences for slack resources stem from individual investor goals and risk profiles 
(Kochhar & David, 1996). Since publicly listed firms are often comprised of many types 
of investors, their preferences will vary and those shareholders controlling the firm 
(either directly or through their proxies) choose their preferred policies for the use of 
slack resources. Secondary agency research has shown that firms controlled by some 
types of blockholders invest more conservatively than firms controlled by other types of 
blockholders (Faccio, Marchica, & Mura, 2011; Miller et al., 2010). While the findings 
offer evidence of conflict among principals, the proposed Organizational Slack construct 
contains indicators that are representative of the heterogeneous preferences of all 
shareholders, including minority owners. The indicators, including the ratio of dividend 
payouts (Renders & Gaeremynck, 2012), the intensity of research and development (Kim 
et al., 2008) and the level of financial slack (Kim et al., 2008), are explained below and 
have been used in secondary agency studies. Therefore, taken together they represent the 
proposed Organizational Slack construct.  
The dividend payout ratio has been measured in various ways in past research. 
Renders and Gaeremynck (2012) used a ratio of dividend per share divided by earnings 
per share. Setia-Atmaja et al. (2009) measured the dividend payout ratio as total ordinary 




Rasheed (2010) calculated dividends as total dividend payments divided by net profits. 
Faccio et al. (2001) used various indicators with dividends as the numerator and cash, 
earnings, sales, and market capitalization as denominators. Each of the above measures 
tapped the concept that when wealth has already been distributed to shareholders, the 
potential for its misappropriation and disproportionate allocation among shareholders is 
reduced. Therefore, it reduces the severity of secondary agency problems. All of the 
dividend payout ratios are highly correlated and for this study the dividend payout ratio 
was measured as total dividend payments divided by net profits since it is the one most 
commonly used in similar research (La Porta et al., 2000; Yoshikawa & Rasheed, 2010). 
Dividend payout ratios were proposed to exhibit a negative relationship with Shareholder 
Inequity since dividends remove corporate wealth from the discretionary use of 
controlling shareholders (Faccio et al., 2011). 
Investment in R&D is an important component of firm strategy and requires 
significant financial commitment. Kochhar and David (1996) showed that different 
owners have different preferences for the frequency and scope of R&D. Research and 
development is risky since outcomes are unknown and therefore risk-averse shareholders 
may prefer lower amounts allocated to R&D. However, R&D is critical for firm growth 
and survival (Kim et al., 2008). From an agency perspective, greater R&D intensity 
leaves less residual cash that can potentially be misappropriated. Since many firms have 
owners that influence or control the intensity of R&D (e.g., Cronqvist & Fahlenbrach, 
2009; Kim et al., 2008), the measure is appropriate for inclusion in a secondary agency 
context as well. Following prior research, R&D intensity was measured as R&D expense 
as a percentage of sales (Kim et al., 2008; Lee & O’Neill, 2003). Since investment in 




of firm operations (Gugler, 2003), this measured variable was proposed to have a 
negative relationship with Shareholder Inequity.   
High and low levels of financial slack can represent different concerns for 
shareholders as well. For instance, some research found that financial slack leads to 
suboptimal performance (Dittmar & Mahrt-Smith, 2007), a negative effect, whereas other 
research has indicated that financial slack is important for firm growth and flexibility 
(Daniel et al., 2004), a positive effect. Given the equivocal effects of financial slack on 
firm outcomes (noted in prior studies), the preference for financial slack would also vary 
based on shareholder preferences. Moreover, there exists clear evidence that “principal-
principal goal incongruence is aggravated in the increasing presence of financial slack” 
(Kim et al., 2008, p. 414). In accordance with related research, financial slack was 
measured as the ratio of quick assets to liabilities (Greve, 2003; Kim et al., 2008). Firms 
with financial slack provide controlling shareholders with more opportunities to 
expropriate wealth and therefore financial slack was proposed to have a positive 
relationship with Shareholder Inequity.   
In summary, the Organizational Slack construct proposed included the dividend 
payout ratio, the research and development intensity ratio, and the financial slack ratio. 
The first two indicators were expected to have a negative relationship with the 
Organizational Slack construct and were reverse coded for testing. The overall 
relationship between Organizational Slack and Shareholder Inequity was proposed to be 
positive.   
2.3.2 Blockholder Power Measures 
Table 3 in the prior chapter explained the theoretical basis behind the Blockholder 




blocks of stock provides shareholders with additional power to influence strategy. 
Evidence that private benefits exist from holding ownership blocks was presented in 
Chapter 1. Since private benefits of control have been shown to be substantial (Barclay & 
Holderness, 1989), firms with no blockholders (a rare occurrence) are assumed to offer 
small or nonexistent private benefits. Corporate Library categorizes firms with no 
blockholders as “indexed,” defined as “a company where no shareholder owns more than 
1-1.5% of the outstanding shares.” The “indexed” categorization reflects a lower amount 
of conflict (i.e., reduced Shareholder Inequity). Additionally, a positive relationship with 
firm value in the presence of a third strong blockholder was confirmed (Maury & Pajuste, 
2005). That particular structure is representative of a more balanced power structure and 
makes collusion to expropriate wealth from minority shareholders less likely. Therefore, 
the existence of three or more large blockholders was posited to be negatively related to 
the inequity among shareholders as well. 
Alternatively, block ownership represents expropriation possibilities when one 
entity holds greater than five percent (Cronqvist & Fahlenbrach, 2009; Villalonga & 
Amit, 2006).8 A single large shareholder has control and influence in firm strategy 
(Faccio & Lang, 2002). When a second large shareholder chooses to invest in the firm, 
their motivation may stem from the benefits associated with monitoring the first 
blockholder (Gugler & Yurtoglu, 2003) or by benefits obtained through colluding with 
the first blockholder to expropriate wealth from other shareholders (Maury & Pajuste, 
2002). Renders and Gaeremynck (2012) provide weak evidence that a second large 
shareholder will collude with the largest shareholder, therefore increasing the conflict 
among all shareholders. Additionally, Maury and Pajuste (2005) show collusion to be 
                                                 




more likely than monitoring when there are only two blockholders in a firm. Therefore, 
when a firm has one or two blockholders, the expropriation concern outweighs the 
blockholder monitoring benefits explained in primary agency studies. Therefore, a firm 
ownership structure with no blockholders or one with three or more blockholders may be 
less likely to experience inequity among shareholders. The measure of the number of 
blockholders in a firm was dummy coded as 0 if there existed no blockholders or when 
there were three or more blockholders and as 1 if there were one or two blockholders in 
the firm. Since some blockholder structures promote monitoring while others promote 
colluding (Maury & Pajuste, 2005), the positive indicator was posited to represent the 
existence of greater Shareholder Inequity.   
The largest shareholder in a firm can exert control over the firm’s operations and 
strategy (Faccio & Lang, 2002; Villalonga & Amit, 2009). The percentage ownership 
held by the largest shareholder has been employed as part of a conflict index to assess the 
extent of conflict among principals (Renders & Gaeremynck, 2012) and used as a proxy 
for gauging agency problems in family firms (Setia-Atmaja et al., 2009). When 
ownership concentration is high, so are principal-principal expropriation concerns 
(Young et al., 2008). Therefore the second indicator of inequity among shareholders is 
the percentage of shares owned by the largest shareholder. A large ownership position 
provides greater private benefits and therefore less equitability for all shareholders. Since 
greater ownership positions represent more conflict (Renders & Gaeremynck, 2012), the 
proposed relationship between Shareholder Inequity and the percentage of shares owned 
by the largest shareholder was positive. 
The vast majority of large, publicly traded firms have attracted more than one 




have direct control over firm operations through employment in the firm, but still have 
additional power relative to minority shareholders through other means (Cronqvist & 
Fahlenbrach, 2009; Ravasi & Zattoni, 2009). The various blockholders have preferences 
that may not be in the best interest of all shareholders (Anabtawi, 2005). Outside 
blockholders often have board representation that extends their relative power and 
thereby maintain a greater ability to influence management (Ravasi & Zattoni, 2009). 
These blockholders are more likely to pursue shareholder activism as well. Therefore a 
summation of all outside blockholders (i.e., all those with greater than 5% of a firm’s 
outstanding shares) holdings as a percentage of total shares outstanding reflects 
additional Blockholder Power. The aggregate percentage of the various blockholdings 
was proposed to be positively related to the amount of Shareholder Inequity.  
Each underlying indicator for the Blockholder Power construct, the number of 
blockholders, the percentage owned by the largest shareholder, and the total 
blockholdings, was believed to be positively related to Shareholder Inequity. Therefore, it 
follows that the Blockholder Power construct would be positively related to Shareholder 
Inequity as well. 
2.3.3 Differential Control Measures 
Table 4 in the prior chapter explained the theoretical basis behind the Differential 
Control construct and Table 6 above summarized the proposed measures. The 
Differential Control construct includes variables that represent the “most extreme” 
situations of governance concern (Gompers et al., 2010). Differential voting, through the 
use of dual class shares, has long been established in the private benefits of control and 
secondary agency literatures (Barclay & Holderness, 1989; La Porta et al., 2000). A 




therefore, the largest shareholder is often able to control a firm’s operations with a 
relatively small direct stake in its cash-flow rights (Claessens et al., 2002). The situation 
has also been referred to as controlling minority shareholders. Therefore, the existence of 
dual class shares in a firm is indicative of greater inequity among shareholders. This 
study included a dual class share indicator, coded as 1 if the company has issued multiple 
classes of shares and 0 otherwise. 
The wedge between voting and control rights that often exists in a dual class share 
is often cited as a significant source of shareholder conflict (e.g., Gompers et al., 2010; 
Renders & Gaeremynck, 2012). The wedge was collected from the proxy statements of 
companies that have dual class shares. Specifically, the wedge was measured as the 
proportional ratio between voting rights and cash rights associated with the special share 
class for each firm (Fan & Wong, 2002). According to prior research that analyzed the 
structure of all publically traded dual class companies in the United States, the most 
frequent proportion between share classes is 10:1, but it can range even higher in some 
firms (Gompers et al., 2010). Those firms with a single class share were assigned a value 
of 1 (on this variable) while higher values indicated increased disproportionate control 
that was proposed to be positively related to Shareholder Inequity. 
Disproportionate control of a firm and the resulting inequity among shareholders 
may also stem from share ownership by top managers and directors (Singla et al., 2014). 
Use of stock options and grants to align management and shareholder interests (in order 
to reduce primary agency problems) has created new principals who now can obtain 
disproportionate benefits from their shares (Alessandri & Seth, 2014). In the research 
presented here, top managers (and directors) who control the firm are not merely agents. 




preferences from other shareholders combined with the ability to extract private benefits 
of control. Therefore, the percentage of outstanding shares held by top managers and 
directors was proposed to be positively related to Shareholder Inequity.  
 The existence of dual class shares, the voting ratio between share classes, and the 
percentage of shares held by top managers and directors were all predicted to have a 
positive relationship with Shareholder Inequity. Therefore, the Differential Control 
construct was also predicted to have a positive relationship with Shareholder Inequity. 
2.3.4 Absence of Board Neutrality Measures 
The Absence of Board Neutrality construct was explained in the previous chapter 
and summarized in Table 5. Proposed measures for the construct were presented in Table 
6 above. Independent and unaffiliated directors represent an important line of defense for 
minority shareholders and they should be present to offset owner control (Anderson & 
Reeb, 2004; Dahya et al., 2008). Many primary agency studies categorize board members 
according to the definition in Corporate Library, where board members are labeled as 
inside (employees), outside (fully independent) or outside-related (on-going relationship 
with management). Unfortunately the categorization does not identify directors that are 
owners or those that represent owner groups. Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach (2009) show 
that block owners have a greater influence on strategy when they are officers or board 
members of a firm as well. Agrawal and Nasser (2011) argue that 1% of a large 
company’s outstanding equity is a substantial block when combined with power from 
board membership. Therefore, the following section concerning board neutrality defines 
block ownership at the 1% or greater level for directors and officers of the company. 
Additionally, since this study is focused on the conflict among owners, commonly 




Peng (2004) recognized the inadequacy of board independence in secondary 
agency studies and adjusted his measure to include government owner-representation on 
the board. Additionally, Dahya et al. (2008) considered a director affiliated if that 
individual met any of six different conditions, but three of their conditions are less 
relevant to the sample included in this research9. To create the affiliated director measure 
in the study here, the following three conditions were considered for each current board 
member identified as independent in Corporate Library: (1) he/she is a blockholder, (2) 
he/she is an employee of a blockholder, or (3) he/she has the same family name as a 
blockholder (steps will be taken to confirm the family relationship when the last name is 
common). Since board members in the proposed sample may have additional relevant 
relationships with blockholders, an additional condition was also included: (4) he/she is 
affiliated with a blockholder. Company affiliation is defined on Capital IQ as, “all the 
companies a person is/was associated with (as board, executive and committee).” Board 
members were therefore only considered truly unaffiliated (and independent) when none 
of the four above conditions existed, and all other directors were labeled and coded as 
affiliated. The data were collected from Capital IQ and proxy statements. Higher 
percentages of affiliated directors were proposed to reflect an Absence of Board 
Neutrality and therefore more Shareholder Inequity.  
The board of directors in a corporation is required to monitor and protect the 
interests of all shareholders from managerial expropriation. Board members who own no 
shares of the corporation on whose boards they serve are rare (Ferris & Yan, 2007). In 
                                                 
9The excluded measures are: he/she is a director or employee in any company or subsidiary of any 
company that is positioned above the sample firm in the ownership tree, he/she is of the same nationality as 
the dominant shareholder when the dominant shareholder is a foreigner, and he/she is a politician or 
employee of a government agency when the dominant shareholder is a government. In other samples these 




fact, some companies have policies requiring certain levels of share ownership while 
serving as a board member, in order to alleviate primary agency concerns (Bhagat & 
Bolton, 2013). Even when not required, directors do not often self-select zero ownership 
since the private benefits of ownership combined with directorships may be substantial 
(Barclay & Holderness, 1989). Theoretically, directors who own shares are in a position 
of disproportionate control per share of ownership, which represents secondary agency 
conflict. Therefore, the number of zero-share directors on a firm’s board was proposed to 
reflect that the Board is more neutral and therefore negatively related to the inequity 
among shareholders.  
CEO duality is often measured and studied in primary agency research (Krause, 
Semadeni, & Cannella, 2014). Similar to the board independence measure, the variable 
must be adjusted to reflect secondary agency problems by including an ownership 
component. Therefore, when the CEO serves as the Chair on the board of directors 
(duality) and is a blockholder, conflict among shareholders could be exacerbated. In their 
study of secondary agency conflict in Chinese corporations, Su et al. (2008) measured 
duality with an ordinal variable coded as 3 if the CEO was also chairperson of the board, 
2 if the CEO took on a director’s position other than the chair, and 1 if the CEO was 
entirely separated from board positions. But the authors did not include ownership 
measures. Therefore, the variable in this study was coded as 0 if the CEO is not on the 
board, 1 if the CEO is on the board; 2 if the CEO is on the board and a blockholder; 3 if 
the CEO is chair of the board and a blockholder. Tuggle, Sirmon, Reutzel, and Bierman 
(2010) showed that firms with the top executive in a dual role had boards that were less 




disproportionate control by an inside owner creates a less neutral board and was proposed 
to have a positive relationship with Shareholder Inequity.  
The affiliated director measure and the adjusted duality measure were both 
proposed to be positively related to Shareholder Inequity while the zero-share measure is 
proposed to be negatively related. The zero-share measure was reverse coded for testing. 
Therefore, the overall relationship between the Absence of Board Neutrality and 
Shareholder Inequity was proposed to be positive.  
2.4 METHODOLOGY 
2.4.1 Sample and Data Collection 
The sample population consisted of firms from the S&P 1500 in 2013. The S&P 
1500 includes large cap, mid cap, and small cap firms that are publicly traded in the 
United States. The population was selected because only a limited number of studies have 
explored secondary agency problems within the United States as these firms are often 
assumed to have diffused ownership (Young et al., 2008). However, Holderness (2009) 
found that the ownership of U.S. firms appeared no more diffuse than those in other 
countries. In his sample of U.S. firms, 96% have blockholders with 5% ownership or 
more and blockholders in total owned an average of 39% of the equity. Additionally, the 
S&P 1500 index was chosen since it includes various market caps of publicly traded 
firms, as opposed to the more common approach of studying only the largest firms, and 
therefore the findings will have greater generalizability (Alessandri & Seth, 2014). All 
S&P 1500 firms were included in the sample except the Utility (SIC headers 48 and 49) 
and Financial (SIC header 6) sectors since they are highly regulated and therefore 
typically excluded from analyses such as this one (Acharya, Amihud, & Litov, 2011; 




 In order to achieve statistical power in the factor analysis, Hair, Black, Babin, 
and Anderson (2010) suggest that at least 5 observations per variable should be collected 
and this research exceeds the threshold. For additional confirmation of sample size 
requirements, an a priori power analysis using G*Power10 was conducted and a minimum 
sample size of 76 firms was identified (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009). The 
projected sample size of approximately 1000 firms (after the above sectors and firms with 
missing data were excluded) was identified as large enough to ensure that the findings 
from the factor analysis of the proposed constructs and structure would achieve 
significant statistical power.  
To begin the data collection process, company level firm financial data were 
collected from Compustat. The information was merged with board member and 
governance data obtained from GMI Ratings. Then, the remaining ownership and board 
member data from Capital IQ were also added. Excluding the Utility and Financial 
sectors of the S&P 1500 resulted in an initial sample of 1100 firms. Data for the potential 
sample were checked before and after merging and firms with missing, conflicting, or 
incorrect data were removed. The final sample achieved for the statistical testing included 
748 firms. Although lower than the originally projected sample size, the sample was still 
much larger than the minimum requirements for the statistical testing to achieve the 
necessary power in the results. 
2.4.2 Proposed Model Structure 
Throughout the first two chapters, an extensive list of possible measures was 
presented to examine the theoretical domains underlying secondary agency problems. 
The measures were predicted to represent the different facets of secondary agency 
                                                 
10 A power analysis identifies the sample size necessary to identify significant relationships that exist (Hair, 




problems. The facets, or underlying constructs, are the formative indicators that comprise 
the proposed Shareholder Inequity index. The index representing secondary agency 
problems was proposed to load as a reflective-formative second order hierarchical 
construct that combines the reflective first order constructs under a more general second 
order concept. Measurement theory explains that reflective constructs represent the 
related indicators and their co-variations while formative constructs are explained by 
their related indicators (Hair, Hult, Ringle, & Sarstedt, 2014). Additionally, the indicators 
for a reflective construct are a representative sample of possible items while the 
indicators for a formative construct are a more complete measure of a construct’s domain 
(Hair et al., 2010). 
The proposed reflective first order constructs were Organizational Slack, 
Blockholder Power, Differential Control, and Absence of Board Neutrality. The 
dimensions were modeled as first order constructs to represent the conceptual level of 
abstraction while Shareholder Inequity is formed by the existence of all these dimensions 
and is therefore a formative higher order construct. As predicted by theory, the model 
performed well statistically with the structure shown below. The conceptual model of the 






























2.4.3 PLS-SEM and Preliminary Tests 
In strategic management, researchers primarily rely on “first-generation” 
techniques such as regression analysis and ANOVA. Ketchen, Boyd, and Bergh (2008) 
encourages the use of “second-generation” techniques like structural equation modeling 
(SEM) to create more appropriate and theoretically-based construct measures instead of 
proxies. In line with the encouragement, CB-SEM and PLS-SEM are increasingly used in 
the strategic management field (Hair, Sarstedt, Pieper, & Ringle, 2012; Podsakoff, Shen, 
& Podsakoff, 2006). Partial least squares structural equation modeling (PLS-SEM) was 
chosen as the technique for this research since it is appropriate for theory development 
(Hair, 2012) and is the preferred SEM approach for secondary data analysis (Sarstedt, 
Ringle, Smith, Reams, & Hair, 2014).  
Factor analysis enables researchers to incorporate unobservable variables in their 




while accounting for measurement error in observed variables (Hair et al., 2014). PLS-
SEM incorporates confirmatory factor analysis in the evaluation of the outer model, or 
measurement model. Additionally, PLS-SEM is appropriate since reflective and 
formative constructs are both incorporated in the model of Shareholder Inequity and the 
endogenous construct had no measures (Sarstedt et al., 2014). Since a validated measure 
that represented all facets of secondary agency did not exist, the repeated indicators 
approach with mode B was employed (Becker et al., 2012). To employ the repeated 
indicator approach, each measured indicator from the lower order constructs were 
assigned to the higher order construct to establish the measurement model. Mode B 
represents that the repeated indicator model was tested as formative. The PLS algorithm 
was run using the path weighting scheme (Hair et al., 2014).  
 PLS-SEM involves a series of OLS regressions that calculate latent variable 
scores from exact linear combinations of the measured variables (Hair, Ringle, & 
Sarstedt, 2011). With reflective constructs, like the first order relationships, the outer 
loadings represent the relationship from the construct (independent) to the measured 
variable (dependent). The process is repeated for each measure to the associated construct 
(Hair et al., 2014). The paths between the first order constructs (independent) and the 
second order construct (dependent) represent the standardized coefficients in a regression 
equation. In many models the regressions produce an R2 value, but since this research 
involves a second order model, the paths represent the relative contributions of each 
underlying dimension associated with secondary agency problems11 (Becker et al., 2012). 
While the relationships between the first order and second order constructs 
performed well, there were a few indicator variables that were not fully representative of 
                                                 
11 Tables with the referenced relationships and values will be presented once all measures included in the 




the first order constructs. When the measurement model was tested, R&D Intensity (OS2) 
loaded poorly. The measure had been reverse coded to represent the negative relationship 
with Organizational Slack, but was still negatively correlated after the reverse coding. 
Past research shows the importance of considering industry when evaluating R&D 
intensity, but adapting the measure to control for industry still did not improve the 
relationships to an acceptable level (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1989). Therefore the 
measure was removed from the final model. Similarly, the Absence of Board Neutrality 
construct’s zero-share director measure (BN2) was negatively coded with inconsistent 
patterns in the construct’s loadings and was removed as well. The dummy variable that 
incorporated the number of blockholders (BP1) also loaded negatively and was 
eliminated since the relationships were unclear.12 The theoretical basis for the BP1 
measure was established in the European context and therefore the blockholding 
relationships may be different in U.S. firms (Faccio & Lang, 2002; Maury & Pajuste, 
2005). Once the three measures were eliminated, the indicator loadings were directionally 
correct, but two additional indicators, BP3 and DC2, were subsequently eliminated 
during the various statistical tests, as explained in later sections. 
2.4.4 Final Model and Results 
 For reflective constructs in a second order model, the internal consistency, 
indicator reliability, and convergent validity should be evaluated (Hair et al., 2011). To 
test the formative constructs in the second order model, convergent validity, collinearity, 
and relative contributions of the constructs were evaluated (Diamantopoulos, 2011). For 
the structural model as a whole, the predictive relevance and path coefficient significance 
were evaluated (Hair et al., 2011). The results concerning the reflective constructs 
                                                 




(dimensions) will be explained first, followed by the formative relationships, and then the 
overall model.  
Traditionally, Cronbach’s alpha is used to evaluate construct reliability, but in 
PLS the evaluation of the composite reliability score is more appropriate (Hair et al., 
2014). The estimation of Cronbach’s alpha is based on the equal weighting of each 
indicator while the composite reliability score uses the indicator’s actual outer loadings in 
the equation. Acceptable levels of composite reliability range from .6-.9. All constructs 
exhibited acceptable construct reliability scores as shown in Table 7. The Organizational 
Slack construct had the lowest score at .724. Blockholder Power had a .819 composite 
reliability score while the Differential Control and Absence of Board Neutrality 
constructs had the highest scores, .834, as shown in Table 7.   
Convergent validity is achieved when the Average Variance Extracted (AVE) of 
the construct is .5 or higher (Hair et al., 2014). The AVE describes the constructs’   
extracted variance and communality between a construct’s indicators (Hair et al., 2014). 
All constructs met this requirement as well. Similar to the composite reliability scores, 
Organizational Slack was the lowest (.572), then Blockholder Power (.694), followed by 
the Differential Control (.718) and Absence of Board Neutrality constructs (.718). Table 
7 shows each abbreviation that represents the constructs in the remaining tables, the 
AVE, and the composite reliability scores for each construct representing a specific 

















OrgSlack .572 .724 
Blockholder 
Power 
BlockPower .694 .819 
Differential 
Control 
DiffControl .718 .834 
Absence of 
Board Neutrality 
AbsenceNeutralBOD .718 .834 
While construct and convergent reliability levels were acceptable, two indicators 
exhibited loadings that were lower than the recommended .7 level (Hair et al., 2014). The 
Blockholder Power measure of outside blockholdings (BP3) was the lowest at .423. The 
lower loading could be explained by findings in Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach (2009) that 
showed that certain blockholders were significantly more influential when their 
ownership was combined with management involvement (Differential Control) or board 
representation (Absence of Board Neutrality). Since the Blockholder Power’s indicator 
BP3 only examined outside blockholders, their influence on firm policy may be limited. 
The level was just above the minimum .4 loading that is acceptable in exploratory 
studies. Measures between .4-.7 should be eliminated if the removal improves the AVE 
(Hair et al., 2014). Since the BP3 measure’s removal improved the AVE, it was 
eliminated from the model. 
With the removal of BP3, Blockholder Power was reduced to a single indicator 
construct. Since single item constructs are to be avoided in PLS when possible 
(Diamantopoulos, Sarstedt, Fuchs, Wilczynski, & Kaiser, 2012), other potential 
indicators were considered that would represent the construct more appropriately. As 
explained in the last section, the original dummy variable that measured the power 




for negative loadings and uninterpretable results. The interactions among the various 
blockholders has been shown as a component of secondary agency conflict (Gugler & 
Yurtoglu, 2003; Maury & Pajuste, 2005; Sacristán-Navarro, Gómez-Ansón, & Cabeza-
García, 2011); so a different measure to capture that interaction was important to include 
in the Shareholder Inequity model. Renders and Gaeremynck (2012) originally included a 
variable in their index that represented the difference between the ownership blocks of 
the largest and second largest shareholders. The measure was dummy coded as 1 if the 
difference was greater than 10% and 0 otherwise, but it was excluded from their final 
index since it exhibited a weak positive influence on the conflict index (Renders & 
Gaeremynck, 2012). Therefore, it was not originally considered for inclusion in the 
Shareholder Inequity model either. Since Renders and Gaeremynck’s (2012) study was 
conducted in a different context and excluded components of secondary agency 
problems, the measure was re-evaluated for inclusion in the Shareholder Inequity model 
as it seemed appropriate to capture the interactions that influenced the power of some 
blockholders. The measure was duplicated with the current sample data and introduced as 
BlockDiff in the Blockholder Power construct. The BlockDiff indicator was more 
representative of the Blockholder Power construct and included in the final Shareholder 
Inequity model.  
The second indicator that did not load as expected was the Organizational Slack 
measure of financial slack (OS3) at .612. While the number was still below the preferred 
threshold for retention in the model (.7), indicators that are theoretically appropriate 
should not be removed from the model unless there is a significant improvement in the 




secondary agency problems (Kim et al., 2008) and since the removal of OS3 did not 
improve the AVE, it was retained in the model.    
Covariance based SEM (CB-SEM) requires a minimum of three measures per 
construct, but two-item constructs are appropriate in PLS-SEM since the method does not 
have the same imposed identification constraints (Diamantopoulos et al., 2012). The only 
restriction on the repeated indicators method employed for model testing with PLS-SEM 
is that each of the constructs in the model should have the same number of measured 
variables (Becker et. al., 2012). Since the Differential Control construct had three 
indicators while each of the other constructs had two, the three measures (DC1, DC2, and 
DC3) were evaluated for removal. The dual class dummy variable (DC1) and the dual 
class wedge variable (DC2) were the most highly correlated while the insider ownership 
variable (DC3) seemed to represent a different aspect of the Differential Control 
dimension of secondary agency conflict. Since the DC1 dummy variable and the DC3 
percentage were included in the Renders and Gaeremynck’s (2012) conflict index and the 
DC2 variable was measured differently in their study, DC1 and DC3 were retained while 
DC2 was excluded from the final model. 
The final tested PLS-SEM model is shown below in Figure 2. All indicator 
loadings are shown on the path between the individual indicator and their related 
construct in Figure 2 and again in Table 8, which also shows the indicator cross-loadings. 
All loadings meet acceptable levels and, with the exception of the financial slack measure 





Figure 2: Final Shareholder Inequity Model  
 
The next test of the model was the examination of the discriminant validity. When 
models achieve discriminant validity, it establishes that the constructs were truly distinct 
from one another (Hair et al., 2014). The first test of discriminant validity involved the 
evaluation of each indicator’s crossloadings with the various constructs in the model. 
Measured variables should be more correlated to their assigned construct than to any 
other constructs in the model (Henseler, Ringle, & Sinkovics, 2009). Table 8 offers 
evidence of discriminant validity as no significant cross-loadings were identified. Table 8 
also includes the measure labels as proposed and the final measure labels that were 




















OS1 DivPay .849 .057 .045 .074 
OS3 FincSlack .650 .047 -.026 .047 
BP2 LargestBlock .085 .863 .367 .095 
N/A BlockDiff .026 .803 .255 .109 
DC1 DualClass -.035 .136 .751 .110 
DC3 InsideOwn .048 .433 .934 .372 
BN1 AffilDirector .107 .167 .397 .946 
BN3 ModDuality -.002 -.022 .044 .735 
 
As an additional test of discriminant validity, the Fornell-Larker criteria were 
assessed (Fornell & Larker, 1981). In the test, each construct’s squared AVE must be 
higher than the correlation with the other constructs. The Fornell-Larker test offered 
further evidence of discriminant validity in the Shareholder Inequity model, as shown in 
Table 9. 




OrgSlack BlockPower DiffControl 
OrgSlack .756 1     
BlockPower .833 .069 1   
DiffControl .848 .021 .378 1 
AbsenceNeutralBOD .847 .082 .121 .321 
  
Recent findings suggest that evaluation of crossloadings and the Fornell-Larker 
criteria may not represent discriminant validity correctly and recommend the Heterotrait-
monotrait ratio (HTMT) test (Henseler, Ringle, & Sarstedt, 2014). To obtain the HTMT 
ratio, the correlations of the indicators across constructs and the correlations of indicators 
within the same construct were compared (Henseler, Ringle, & Sarstedt, 2014). The 




Ringle, & Sarstedt, 2014). Therefore, it was confirmed that the constructs exhibit 
discriminant validity as shown in Table 10. 
Table 10: Heterotrait-monotrait Ratio 
Construct OrgSlack BlockPower DiffControl 
OrgSlack   
  
BlockPower  .173     
DiffControl  .010 .549   
AbsenceNeutralBOD   .145 .143 .346 
  
The next area of testing is the formative portion of the model that evaluates the 
relationships among the dimensions and their contributions to Shareholder Inequity. To 
validate the formative portion of the model, convergent validity, multicollinearity, and 
statistical significance of the paths were evaluated (Hair et al., 2014). To assess the 
convergent validity of a formative model, a redundancy analysis was performed (Chin, 
1998). A redundancy analysis uses a formatively measured construct (Shareholder 
Inequity) as the independent variable that predicts another construct that measures the 
same phenomenon and is measured reflectively or as a single item. The magnitude of the 
path between the two constructs should be at least .8 (Hair et al., 2014). Since Renders 
and Gaeremynck’s (2012) conflict index seemed the closest possible match, data for their 
index were collected and compared to the new model of secondary agency conflict. The 
strength of the path coefficient between Shareholder Inequity and the conflict index was 
.8130. 
The absence of significant collinearity was tested through the evaluation of 
Tolerance and VIF levels. It is especially important to test for multicollinearity in 
formative models since the constructs should measure different theoretical components 
that combine to create the endogenous construct (Hair et al., 2011). The extent of 




other three. According to Hair et al. (2014), in PLS-SEM the tolerance (TOL) levels 
should be above .2 and the variance inflation factor (VIF) levels should fall below 5. 
Table 11 shows that each construct’s values were well below the critical levels of 
multicollinearity with the lowest TOL being only .779 and the highest VIF being only 
1.283.    
Table 11: Multicollinearity Assessment 
Construct TOL VIF 
OrgSlack=BlockPower+DiffControl+AbsenceNeutralBOD .989 1.011 
BlockPower=OrgSlack+DiffControl+AbsenceNeutralBOD  .854 1.172 





The final evaluation of a formative model is the assessment of the relative 
importance of the various paths leading to the endogenous construct (Hair et al., 2014). In 
the Shareholder Inequity model, all paths (and therefore dimensions), contribute at 
similar levels. Therefore, all four dimensions are important and similarly related to 
secondary agency conflict and should be included in the structural model. The Absence 
of Board Neutrality construct is the largest contributor (.430), followed by Differential 
Control (.415) and Blockholder Power (.404), and then the Organizational Slack 
construct (.376). The path values are also shown in Table 12 that illustrates the 
significance of the relationships.  
To evaluate the structural model as a whole, bootstrapping and blindfolding 
procedures were administered in SmartPLS (Ringle et al., 2005). Bootstrapping evaluates 
the significance of the relationships by calculating the t-values from the standard errors 
(Sarstedt et al., 2014). The bootstrapping procedure analyzes the path coefficients 




measured variables and their assigned first order constructs (Hair et al., 2014). The path 
values, T-statistics, and significance levels are shown in Table 12. All relationships in the 
final model were significant at the <.0001 level.  
Table 12: Significance Testing 
Construct Paths Path/Loading T-Statistics Significance 
OrgSlack->ShareInequity .376 40.801 <.0001 
BlockPower_> ShareInequity .404 38.134 <.0001 
DiffControl-> ShareInequity .415 42.995 <.0001 
AbsenceNeutralBOD-> 
ShareInequity 
.430 44.984 <.0001 
DivPay<-OrgSlack .849 10.351 <.0001 
FinSlack<-OrgSlack .649 4.33 <.0001 
LargestBlock<-BlockPower .863 42.972 <.0001 
BlockDiff<-BlockPower .803 27.834 <.0001 
Dual Class<-DiffControl .751 10.619 <.0001 
InsideOwn<-DiffControl .934 114.420 <.0001 
AffilDirector<-AbsenceNeutralBOD .946 91.094 <.0001 
ModDuality<-AbsenceNeutralBOD .735 16.600 <.0001 
  
Since PLS-SEM has no appropriate goodness-of-fit measure, the overall 
predictive ability is determined by the Q2 value (Rigdon, 2014). To obtain the Q2 value, 
the blindfolding procedure on SmartPLS was employed. Blindfolding establishes an 
omission distance and then removes the indicators one at a time and measures the 
parameters with the data points that remain (Chin, 1998; Henseler et al., 2009). When 
evaluating predictive relevance, values greater than .02, .15, and .35 indicate that an 
exogenous construct has a small, medium, or large predictive relevance for an 
endogenous construct. The Shareholder Inequity construct in the model had an average 






2.5 SUMMARY, CONTRIBUTIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
2.5.1 Summary 
In this chapter each variable that has been employed previously in the evaluation 
of secondary agency conflicts was reviewed and defined. The variables were linked to the 
dimensions of the conflict among the firm’s principals: Organizational Slack, 
Blockholder Power, Differential Control, and Absence of Board Neutrality. The 
relationships between the various proposed constructs and secondary agency conflicts, 
and therefore the Shareholder Inequity within a firm, were also analyzed. Following 
Venkatraman (1989), the proposed Shareholder Inequity measure was created 
methodically by exploring the different dimensions of the construct based on the 
theoretical underpinnings, in order to reduce measurement error.  
2.5.2 Contributions 
The lack of consistent definitions and measurement tools for secondary agency 
conflict represented a gap in the governance literature. Clear definitions and boundaries 
for the dimensions of secondary agency conflict have now been established for future 
studies that employ these constructs (Suddaby, 2010). As explained in extant literature, a 
consistent definition that explains the various dimensions is necessary to legitimize 
phenomena and constructs (Short, Payne, & Ketchen, 2008). Defining dimensions leads 
to a greater understanding of the antecedents and consequences that is required for theory 
building (Eisenhardt, 1989). Consequently the valid and generalizable index produced in 
this study is an important step in the understanding of the conflict among shareholders in 
a firm. While the Shareholder Inequity measure is an important contribution to scholarly 




investors to incorporate in their decision making when evaluating potential and current 
investments.  
Each theoretical dimension of Shareholder Inequity was tested and analyzed using 
the PLS-SEM methodology. While a few of the proposed measured variables had to be 
removed or adjusted, the proposed dimensions and overall structure of the model were 
confirmed. The statistical validation of the proposed model conforms to the theoretical 
predictions of prior secondary agency research. The Organizational Slack, Blockholder 
Power, Differential Control, and Absence of Board Neutrality constructs exhibited 
internal consistency, indicator reliability, convergent validity, and statistical significance. 
Secondary agency conflict is shown to comprise of four separate underlying dimensions 
that do not exhibit high levels multicollinearity, but instead are correlated and explain one 
factor, Shareholder Inequity. Therefore, it can be concluded that the proposed model is a 
valid measure of secondary agency problems in firms. This measure of secondary agency 
conflict can and should be employed in future research so that governance problems are 
more easily identified and suitable remedies explored.  
To further establish model stability and generalizability (Hair et al., 2010), the 
measure of Shareholder Inequity and the underlying dimensions were subsequently tested 
by examining the market reaction to acquisition announcements. The results are 
presented in Chapter 3. The extent of inequity exhibited by each acquiring firm was 
analyzed to understand the market reaction to the announced strategic choices of firms 
with various levels of secondary agency conflict. Multiple control variables, including 
those that represented primary agency conflict, were included in the regression models so 
that the effects related to the firm’s slack resources, ownership power and control, and 




2.5.3 Limitations and Future Research 
As with any research there are limitations in this study. It is possible that all the 
dimensions of secondary agency conflicts have not been identified in research to date, but 
every effort has been made to ensure that the variables employed in prior studies were 
included in order to avoid model misspecification. Ownership “type” is often included in 
studies of conflict among principals (e.g., Sacristán-Navarro et al., 2011; Villalonga & 
Amit, 2009), but that was beyond the scope of the research. Additionally, the repeated 
indicators approach to structural equation modeling of proposed constructs is a relatively 
new method. The repeated indicator approach allows for the exploration of new 
constructs and additional testing is encouraged as the methodology is further refined. 
Lastly, since ownership trends and structures vary between countries and regions, the 
proposed constructs will need to be adjusted when used in other contexts. 
The newly developed measure of secondary agency conflict could be applied in 
many contexts. Researchers could introduce the type of owner (e.g., family firms, 
institutions, activists) as a moderator. This may allow for identification of certain types of 
firms that should be scrutinized more carefully for the presence of secondary agency 
problems. Future research could examine the constructs in other countries that have 
different ownership structures, laws, and political pressures. Studies considering the 
potential trade-offs between primary agency and secondary agency should be encouraged 
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3.1 PAPER TWO ABSTRACT 
While firm acquisitions have been studied extensively in the context of primary 
agency theory, considerably less attention has been given to secondary agency theoretical 
concerns. In the preceding two chapters, a new measure representing the extent of 
inequity among shareholders was introduced and tested. The Shareholder Inequity model 
was found to capture the underlying theoretical dimensions of secondary agency conflict. 
This chapter offers further validation by testing the measure in a model with a different 
dataset spanning multiple years. Additionally, the incongruence among principals which 
stems from disparate preferences for Organizational Slack, varying degrees of 
Blockholder Power, Differential Control, the Absence of Board Neutrality, and the 
combination of the domains (Shareholder Inequity) was assessed in an acquisition 
announcement event study. The regression results offer evidence that several of the 
constructs representing the underlying dimensions and the overall measure of secondary 
agency problems significantly influence the market’s reaction to announced acquisitions. 
In firms with secondary agency problems investors seemed to recognize that some 
strategic changes were beneficial in some way (either pecuniary or non-pecuniary) to a 
particular shareholder or groups of shareholders, while reducing the future value of the 
firm. The presented research also offers evidence that the market’s negative reaction is 
greater when firms with secondary agency conflict announce acquisitions that are 





3.2 ACQUISITION LITERATURE REVIEW 
Acquisition decisions are one of the most significant corporate resource allocation 
decisions that have the potential to influence shareholder wealth (Wan & Yiu, 2009). 
Early research claimed that acquisitions produced positive returns, but further 
investigation revealed that increased profitability for the target firms accounted for the 
majority of those gains, while acquiring firms experienced neutral or negative returns 
(Haleblian, Devers, McNamara, Carpenter, & Davison, 2009). Therefore, scholars 
investigated alternate explanations for the frequency of acquisition activity. Based on a 
meta-analytic study, King, Dalton, Daily, and Covin (2004) suggested that nonfinancial 
motives may be under-represented in theory and research that seeks to explain merger 
and acquisition (M&A) activities and outcomes. 
One common theoretical explanation provided for value reducing acquisitions is 
primary agency conflict (Eisenhardt, 1989). According to agency theory, managers may 
pursue unprofitable acquisitions for financial and socio-emotional reasons that are not in 
the best interest of shareholders (Gomez-Mejia, & Wiseman, 1997; Jensen, 1986). A 
current and related line of research examines shareholder value destruction in acquisition 
activity by employing the Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick’s (2003) anti-takeover index to 
represent firms that have the most severe primary agency conflicts (Harford, Humphery-
Jenner, & Powell, 2012; Masulis, Wang, & Xie, 2007). Harford et al. (2012) and Masulis 
et al. (2007) both offered evidence of entrenched managers classified as “dictators” who 
chose poor targets for acquisition activity leading to significantly lower post-
announcement period abnormal stock returns, and therefore the destruction of firm value.  
While prior agency research has investigated the conflict between owners and 




in publicly listed firms (Dharwadkar, George, & Brandes, 2000; Faccio, Lane & Young; 
Young, Peng, Ahlstrom, Bruton, & Jiang, 2008). There are two important considerations 
when transitioning from the established primary agency conflicts to secondary agency 
conflicts. The first is that primary agency theory has placed the blame for the agency 
conflict solely on managers (Masulis et al., 2007), but research has shown that managers 
of publicly listed firms do not choose strategy independently. Instead, they are highly 
influenced by many sources including, but not limited to, the board of directors, 
institutional investors, and founders or their families (Barclay & Holderness, 1989; 
Devers, McNamara, Haleblian, & Yoder, 2013; Harford, Jenter, & Li, 2007; Villalonga 
& Amit, 2009).  
The second point is that the increased use of ownership stakes to align 
management and shareholder interests (intended to reduce primary agency problems) 
have unforeseen and sometimes undesirable consequences (Alessandri & Seth, 2014). 
One such consequence is the creation of a new set of principals that derive 
disproportionate control (and benefits) from their share ownership. Both influential 
principals and managerial principals are in a position to manipulate the strategic direction 
of the firm and may prefer acquisitions that are not value-maximizing for all shareholders 
(Dharwadkar et al., 2000). For example, Miller, Le Breton-Miller, and Lester (2010) 
showed that family firms are more likely to pursue diversifying acquisitions to reduce the 
family’s personal portfolio risk. However, as argued by Anderson and Reeb (2003), risk 
reduction in the family’s portfolio would not necessarily benefit the non-family 
shareholders since the minority shareholders’ wealth (and, by implication, risk) is not 
concentrated in one firm. This represents secondary agency conflict and illustrates the 




posited that controlling shareholders may even extract high private returns from projects 
yielding negative corporate returns. The private benefits are a consequence of inefficient 
strategic choices in firms with high levels of secondary agency conflict (Young et al., 
2008). 
Acquisitions are complex events with high information asymmetry and risk 
(Boeh, 2011). The value created by the acquisition activity is the present value of all 
future cash flows generated by the acquiring and target firms combined, less the value of 
all future cash flows that would have been earned independently (Schijven & Hitt, 2012). 
Investors’ perceptions of the announced acquisition activity are frequently measured by 
the abnormal stock price changes surrounding the announcement of the activity 
(Haleblian et al., 2009). Research has shown that investors consider potential secondary 
agency conflicts when making investment decisions and act accordingly as evidenced by 
lower cumulative abnormal returns (CAR). CAR represents the market reaction that is 
different from the average trends for a particular firm and it is calculated by summating 
the abnormal stock returns for each day surrounding a particular event (Brown & Warner, 
1980). When shareholders have negative perceptions concerning the announced 
acquisition they will sell their shares, therefore reducing the stock price, and creating 
higher abnormal stock returns. Chen and Young (2010) employed the event study 
methodology to provide evidence that minority shareholders were suspicious of 
announced acquisitions when the Chinese government was a blockholder in the firm, as 
evidenced by a negative CAR. This study examines and answers a more general 
theoretical question. When firms with inherent secondary agency problems announce 
acquisitions, will investors perceive additional inequity and react negatively, as 




To answer the research question, the newly derived construct, Shareholder 
Inequity (representative of secondary agency conflicts among principals within a firm) 
was first disaggregated into the underlying components developed in the prior chapter. 
Hypotheses were tested for the investor reactions to acquisition announcements in 
relation to the underlying components of secondary agency conflict; Organizational 
Slack, Blockholder Power, Differential Control, and Absence of Board Neutrality. An 
additional hypothesis addressed the Shareholder Inequity composite as a whole in 
relation to acquisition frequency and investor perceptions. Lastly, a final hypothesis 
explained the unique effects of secondary agency problems when announcements 
involved diversifying acquisitions. Some of the measured variables that reflect 
Organizational Slack, Blockholder Power, Differential Control, and Absence of Board 
Neutrality have been shown in prior research to negatively impact shareholder wealth at 
the time of acquisition announcements. The new composite constructs, from Chapter 2, 
provided further insights since they reflected particular theoretical areas of secondary 
agency conflict. 
Acquisition activity in firms was an appropriate environment for testing the newly 
developed constructs for multiple reasons. Schijven and Hitt (2012) explained that 
investors consider all available information, including the motivations and perceptions of 
other firm actors. Therefore, once primary agency problems and other variables shown to 
influence investor reactions were controlled for methodologically, additional insights 
were gained from investors' perceptions of the extant conflicts among owners. Paul 
(2007) explained that the announcement return is a function not only of perceived bid 
quality, but also of information unrelated to that bid which is revealed in the decision to 




to acquire, the details of the acquisition, the proposed resulting merged firm or a 
combination of the above factors. The perceptions may lead to a reallocation of the 
owners’ shareholdings in the acquiring firm and also result in overall changes to the 
wealth of all the firm’s shareholders. The reallocation will be captured by the cumulative 
abnormal returns surrounding the acquisition announcement providing a clear and 
measurable reaction to the perceived inequities. The following section explores these 
relationships when a new acquisition is first announced.   
3.3 THEORY AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
3.3.1 Organizational Slack 
Acquisitions are risky and require major resource commitments but are generally 
discretionary in nature (Wan & Yiu, 2009). Conflicts concerning discretionary resources 
are often cited and controlled for in primary agency research (Devers et al., 2013; 
Masulis et al., 2007). Jensen’s (1986) free cash flow hypothesis predicts poor investment 
choices when managers have control of slack resources. As explained above, managers 
are not the sole decision makers; instead they are influenced by owners with special 
interests. The Organizational Slack construct validated in Chapter 2 represents the 
likelihood that firms are not employing resources in a way that is beneficial and equitable 
to the various owners involved. When all excess slack is returned to shareholders in the 
form of dividends, expropriation is not possible (Castaner & Kavadis, 2013). 
Additionally, when excess slack is spent on R&D activities, expropriation is less likely 
(Gugler, 2003). Alternatively, when excess slack exists in an organization, pursuit of 
private benefits by controlling shareholders is more likely (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; 




Past research identified that cash reserves and subsequent acquisition spending 
were positively correlated (Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, & Williamson, 1999). Similarly, 
findings report that companies with larger amounts of slack resources are more likely to 
engage in value-decreasing acquisitions (Harford, 1999). Organizational slack is related 
to more frequent acquisitions and higher premium payments for acquisition targets (Wan 
& Yiu, 2009). Investors account for the higher premiums when considering the value of 
the acquisition (Schijven & Hitt, 2012).  
According to the efficient market hypothesis (Fama, 1970), at any point in time 
the market fully reflects all publicly available information in its share pricing. Investors 
are aware of the levels and allocation of slack resources prior to the acquisition 
announcements, but the announcement provides new information concerning projected 
future allocations of slack. The projected future allocations may not be compatible with 
investors’ goals, and therefore owners may respond by reducing their holdings in the 
firm. Savvy investors are also aware that large amounts of slack encourage the pursuit of 
inefficient strategies (Jensen, 1986), and acquisitions are likely to further decrease value 
for the acquirer’s shareholders (King et al., 2004). Additionally, past research has 
identified that cash-rich firms experience negative stock price reactions (Harford, 1999). 
Investors will account for the allocation of slack resources and recognize that the 
proposed acquisition is likely to further lower the future value of the firm. These owners 
will subsequently reduce their ownership position in reaction to the acquisition 
announcement.  
Therefore, 
H1: Ceteris paribus, there will be a negative market reaction to acquisition 






3.3.2 Blockholder Power 
Recent findings show that competitive actions taken by executives are 
significantly related to a firm’s ownership structure (Connelly, Tihanyi, & Hitt, 2010). 
Most publicly listed firms have at least one block owner and a 5% level of block 
ownership is considered substantial enough to influence policies and strategies 
(Villalonga & Amit, 2006). The Blockholder Power construct validated in Chapter 2 
measures the power large shareholders have relative to minority shareholders. Cronqvist 
and Fahlenbrach (2009) explored blockholder heterogeneity and influence. They found 
that the differences in investment and governance styles across firms with different 
categories of blockholders (e.g., activists, pension funds, individuals, corporations) were 
influential enough to affect firm performance outcomes. Therefore, the different 
investment styles (including the number of acquisitions and the number of diversifying 
acquisitions) may add value for certain types of blockholders without adding value for 
the firm.  
Additionally, many firms have shareholder groups who have cross-holdings in 
both the buyer and target companies. Concentrated shareholders with stakes in only the 
bidder want management to focus on the buyer’s resulting equity value, while 
shareholders with cross-holdings in both the acquiring and target firms are more focused 
on the outcomes for both parties (Harford et al., 2007). Often firm decision-makers are 
alert to blockholders’ interests since activist investors may confront and attempt to 
replace board members and top management teams (Dai, 2007). An increased frequency 
of value-destroying acquisitions has been documented when there is a higher percentage 
of outside blockholder ownership (Paul, 2007).  
The power of firm blockholders drives more frequent acquisitions and also 




(2002) offered evidence that risk preferences of powerful owners influence the target 
selection process. Target selection is one of many areas that shape shareholders’ opinions 
about the value of an announced acquisition. In one example of owner influence, Chen 
and Young (2010) showed that investors were more skeptical of acquisition deals when 
the government had block ownership. Since information about large ownership positions 
is publically available, investors may be aware of and be able to identify the hidden 
pursuit of special interests when acquisitions are announced. One example of this 
occurring in a different announcement setting was the study by Gugler and Yurtoglu 
(2003). They offered evidence that the market reacted more negatively to dividend 
reduction announcements when large shareholders influenced strategic decisions. 
Blockholders and powerful minority shareholders may pressure managers into 
undertaking transactions that produce benefits for them at the expense of the broader 
shareholder base (Anabtawi, 2005). Other investors do account for such influence (Chen 
& Young, 2010; Gugler & Yurtoglu, 2003). Investors in firms with Blockholder Power 
are more likely to have concerns about their true motivations concerning the pursuit of an 
announced acquisition.  
Therefore,  
H2: Ceteris paribus, there will be a negative market reaction to acquisition 
announcements by firms with greater blockholder power in their ownership 
structure. 
3.3.3 Differential Control 
Disproportionate control among shareholders may arise from dual class share 
structures and from inside ownership. The Differential Control construct that was 
validated in Chapter 2 reflects the most direct path to additional control per share owned. 
Dual class shares are a significant source of conflict among shareholders (Renders & 




share class have additional power to direct strategy. Additionally, the increased use of 
ownership stakes to align management and shareholder interests (to reduce primary 
agency problems) has created new principals that obtain disproportionate benefits from 
their shares. These owners/managers often have conflicting preferences and the ability to 
extract private benefits of control. As explained by Hoi and Robin (2010), owners (who 
are also fulfilling a managerial or a board role) are the most able to extract private 
benefits since these shareholders are in a position where the incentives to expropriate are 
coupled with the opportunity to do so.  
Investor reactions to acquisition announcements by firms with Differential 
Control have been studied in related research. Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2009) found dual 
class firms with greater separation between ownership and control generated lower 
returns for their shareholders when they acquired other firms. However, their study 
focused on executive holdings and interpreted expropriation as a primary agency concern. 
A dual class share structure is more appropriately studied in the context of secondary 
agency problems since this structure represents disproportionate control among owners 
(Bebchuk, 1999; Lin, Ma, Malatesta, & Xuan, 2011). Investors’ negative responses to 
acquisitions should remain even after controlling for primary agency costs, since 
managerial ownership levels may also be contributing to secondary agency problems 
resulting in investors’ negative responses (Chen & Young, 2010).  
Additionally, minority shareholders are less likely to have prior knowledge of 
firm decisions since large shareholders dominate the decision-making processes 
involving the company. Minority shareholders are often kept in the dark as to the actual 
status of the corporations of which they are part-owners (Young et al., 2008). Since 




acquisition announcements may cause minority shareholders to re-evaluate the strategic 
alignment and congruence of their goals with those of the organization (and those of the 
dominant shareholders). These investors may perceive that firms with Differential 
Control are not acting in the best interests of all shareholders.  
Therefore,  
H3: Ceteris paribus, there will be a negative market reaction to acquisition 
announcements by firms with greater Differential Control in their governance 
structures. 
3.3.4 Absence of Board Neutrality 
Directors serving on corporate boards are responsible for protecting all 
shareholders from expropriation of their wealth (Fama & Jensen, 1983). But agency 
research indicates that directors often are the “rubber stamp” for managers (Young et al., 
2008). Close relationships between directors and managers (of firms) have been shown to 
compromise the board’s objective and independent monitoring activities and 
consequently weaken its effectiveness as a mechanism that even-handedly protects the 
interests of all shareholders (Brunninge, Nordqvist, & Wiklund, 2007). The Absence of 
Board Neutrality construct validated in Chapter 2 represents how equitably board 
members treat all shareholders’ interests when fulfilling their monitoring and advising 
roles in a firm.  
Building on the primary agency measures of board independence and duality 
(Schleifer & Vishny, 1997) combined with secondary agency studies of ownership 
proximity (Hoi & Robin, 2010), boards are presumed to be less neutral when powerful 
owners and managers dominate firm decisions. Effective board monitoring is integral to 
reducing primary agency problems associated with M&A activity (Goranova, 
Dharwadkar, & Brandes, 2010). However, research has indicated that particular board 




Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach (2009) provided evidence that firms pursue larger numbers of 
acquisitions when blockholders have board representation. Additionally, Dahya, 
Dimitrov, and McConnell (2008), who similarly modified the board independence 
measure to reflect ownership interests, showed increased related party transactions for 
firms with greater percentages of affiliated directors. Since acquisitions often reduce firm 
value, the above findings indicate that boards may approve value-destroying strategies 
when they are influenced by certain owners. While owners may already be aware of the 
composition of the acquirer’s board, the acquisition announcement provides shareholders 
with additional information. When the Board is not equally representing all shareholder 
interests, just the decision to bid may confirm prior shareholder concerns (Paul, 2007). 
Since directors have access to both private firm-specific information as well as 
disproportionate control over firm actions (Kosnik, 1990), their perceived neutrality (or 
lack thereof) is an important consideration for investors when evaluating the value of an 
announced acquisition.  
Therefore, 
H4: Ceteris paribus, there will be a negative market reaction to acquisition 
announcements by firms that exhibit a greater Absence of Board Neutrality in 
their governance structure. 
3.3.5 Shareholder Inequity  
In the previous chapter a composite measure of multiple dimensions underlying 
secondary agency problems was motivated, developed, and tested. The combination of 
the separate dimensions (Organizational Slack, Blockholder Power, Differential Control, 
and Absence of Board Neutrality) represents the Shareholder Inequity construct. Their 
separate relationships with investor reactions to acquisition announcement have been 




Recent research has shown that many CEOs (and their boards) are not confident 
in the value-enhancing characteristics of mergers and acquisitions they have pursued, as 
evidenced by management and director stock sales soon after acquisition announcements 
are made (Devers et al., 2013). Research encouraged additional examinations of the 
motivations behind such moves and suggested several possible influences including the 
managerial pursuit of private interests (Kim & Rasheed, 2013). In the context of 
secondary agency, an alternate (but related) explanation may exist. Often executives are 
in frequent contact with influential shareholders and accordingly take actions more 
aligned with the preferences of these powerful owners since they are aware that their job 
security is at stake if they do not comply (Connelly et al., 2010). Therefore, the 
executives, persuaded by blockholders, may pursue value-destroying strategies that create 
benefits for some influential blockholders at the expense of other shareholders. 
Executives agree to pursue the strategies at the behest of influential owners, but 
concurrently reduce their holdings since they may not be confident about the firm’s 
future profitability.  
Additionally, research has shown that acquisitions often represent a transfer of 
wealth from the acquirer’s shareholders to the target’s shareholders. Institutional owners 
often have equity holdings in both acquiring and target firms (Goranova et al., 2010). The 
owners with cross-holdings would be indifferent to the destruction of wealth for 
acquiring shareholders when that wealth is transferred to the target, since their overall 
portfolio is not affected. Similarly, Harford et al. (2007) explained that concentrated 
shareholders with stakes in only the bidder want management to focus on the acquirer’s 
equity value, while shareholders with cross-holdings are more focused on the success of 




explain the low and often negative returns to acquiring firms in takeovers since bidder 
shareholders with large cross-holdings do not mind overpaying for targets and therefore 
do not block value-destroying takeovers (Matvos & Ostrovsky, 2008). Therefore, 
principals who do not gain additional benefits may perceive higher takeover premiums as 
an indication of a less rational and equitable acquisition decision and will reduce or 
eliminate their ownership position (Schijven & Hitt, 2012). 
Building on the examples presented, the literature explored in the prior chapters, 
and the theoretical arguments for the preceding hypotheses, an argument could be made 
that shareholders will analyze all underlying aspects of secondary agency problems in 
totality when forming perceptions and making conclusions about the proposed 
acquisition. The Shareholder Inequity construct is a combined measure of the inherent 
conflict among various owner groups regarding preferences for slack resources (i.e., 
Organizational Slack), the presence of shareholder blocks who had effective control or 
who could influence those in control (i.e., Blockholder Power and Differential Control), 
and the absence of even-handedness from the board in monitoring and preventing 
expropriation by dominant shareholders (i.e., Absence of Board Neutrality). Firm owners, 
who perceive Shareholder Inequity in a firm’s governance structure and practices, may 
feel their preferences and goals are no longer in alignment with those of the firm (and 
those of the dominant shareholders). Since investors account for all available information 
and form perceptions that drive their reaction to announced acquisitions (Schijven & Hitt, 
2012), they are likely to perceive less value in the firm stemming from the proposed 
acquisition activity and act accordingly.  
Therefore, 
H5: Ceteris paribus, there will be negative market reactions to acquisition 




3.3.6 Unrelated Acquisitions 
The term unrelated acquisition describes the purchase of a target in a different 
industry (Lin, Officer, & Zou, 2011). The strategic decision, also termed diversification, 
involves the acquisition of a firm with few complementary resources or overlapping 
markets and therefore few, if any, potential resource synergies (Castaner & Kavadis, 
2013). Without synergy the proposed acquisitions are difficult to justify in terms of 
value-enhancing potential and therefore could lead to value destruction for the acquiring 
firm’s shareholders (Amihud & Lev, 1981; Hoechle, Schmid, Walter, & Yermack, 2012; 
Morck, Schleifer, & Vishny, 1990). In exploring alternative reasons for the frequency of 
value-destroying acquisitions, research identified that unrelated acquisitions are 
beneficial to managers and less-diversified shareholders, but value-destroying to well-
diversified shareholders. For example, Alessandri and Seth (2014) found that managerial-
owners had different risk tolerances from non-managerial owners leading to conflicting 
preferences for the level of relatedness of selected acquisition targets. Additionally, 
family firms prefer diversifying acquisitions to reduce personal portfolio risk for family 
owners (Miller et al., 2010). In fact, research has shown that certain blockholder styles 
(e.g., growth intensive, financially aggressive) are influential in the adoption of firm 
strategies such as engaging in diversifying acquisitions (Cronqvist & Fahlenbrach, 2009). 
Industry similarity is highly related to investor perceptions concerning acquisition 
premiums (Schijven & Hitt, 2012). Investors use the relatedness of the acquisition to 
evaluate the motivations of firm actors and react negatively to premium payments when 
the acquisition is diversifying in nature (Schijven & Hitt, 2012). Since diversifying 
acquisitions offer extended benefits to some shareholders that are not valuable to all 




shareholders that do not receive the additional benefits are likely to perceive the 
announcement negatively (Schijven & Hitt, 2012).  
Therefore, 
H6: Ceteris paribus, there will be a greater negative market reaction to unrelated 
acquisition announcements by firms with greater Shareholder Inequity. 




The proposed population for the study consisted of all acquisitions announced 
between January 1, 2004 and June 30, 2014 by publicly traded S&P 1500 U.S. firms, 
excluding only the Utility (SIC headers 48 and 49) and Financial (SIC header 6) sectors 




Makhija, 2014). The S&P 1500 index was chosen because it includes various market caps 
of publicly traded firms to increase the generalizability of the findings (Alessandri & 
Seth, 2014) and the most recent time span with available data was selected. A sample size 
of approximately 1000 announcements was expected based on the average number of 
acquisitions announced in the market that adhered to the limitations imposed on both the 
stated population and the criteria noted below:  
1. The deal value disclosed in Capital IQ was more than $1 million and 
was at least 1% of the acquirer’s market value of equity. The minimum 
values were chosen to ensure that the transactions were economically 
significant to the acquiring firm (Gaur, Malhotra, & Zhu, 2013; 
Masulis, Wang, & Xie, 2009).  
2. The target had publicly available financials so that necessary details 
were available in Capital IQ, Compustat, and CRSP (Aktas, De Bodt, & 
Roll, 2011; Gaur et al., 2013). 
The data collection process began with the sample selection explained in the prior 
paragraph. The related acquisition announcements were identified in Capital IQ and 
information was collected to calculate the amount of Shareholder Inequity in each 
acquiring firm. The amount of missing data was greater than expected and led to the 
exclusion of all announcements from 2004, 2005, and 2014. Corporate governance data 
was unavailable for the earlier years and the announcement return data was unavailable 




2006 and December 31, 2013, which resulted in a final dataset of 673 announcements 
with 610 unique firm year combinations.13   
The first goal for the study was the further validation of the new measure of 
secondary agency conflict. Shareholder Inequity and the underlying dimensions, 
Organizational Slack, Blockholder Power, Differential Control, and Absence of Board 
Neutrality, were once again tested with the collected data to further establish model 
stability and generalizability (Hair et al., 2010). The data for this chapter spanned 
multiple years and therefore represented a time in which the firms were engaged in 
significant strategic changes. Similar to the results of Chapter 2, the measurement and 
structural models showed strong reliability and validity. The evaluation of the reflective 
portion of the model showed that each construct exceeded the required level of .5 for the 
AVE and the required level of .6 for the composite reliability; therefore offering evidence 
of convergent and construct reliability (Hair et al., 2014). Table 13 illustrates the 
abbreviation, AVE, and composite reliability of each construct. 
Table 13: Abbreviation, AVE, and Composite Reliabilty 





OrgSlack .555 .694 
Blockholder  
Power 
BlockPower .879 .935 
Differential  
Control 
DiffControl .583 .719 
Absence of Board 
Neutrality 
AbsenceNeutralBOD .682 .810 
 
Further testing confirmed that the constructs exhibited discriminant validity since 
the relationships between the constructs are below the .9 requirement recommended in 
                                                 
13 Some firms in the sample had multiple announcements in the same year. Therefore, all independent 





the analysis of the Heterotrait-monotrait ratio (HTMT) (Henseler, Ringle, & Sarsdedt, 
2014). The HTMT ratio was calculated through comparisons of the correlations of the 
indicators across constructs and the correlations of indicators within the same construct 
(Henseler, Ringle, & Sarstedt, 2014). Financial slack (FinSlack) was found to be 
negatively related to Differential Control with a value of -.049. However, the HTMT 
values should be evaluated as absolute values and therefore all constructs met the 
assessment requirements (Henseler, Ringle, & Sarsdedt, 2014.) 
Table 14: Discriminant Validity Assessment 
Construct 






OrgSlack       
BlockPower .141     
DiffControl -.049 .478   
AbsenceNeutralBO
D 
.416 .339 .588 
 
 
Table 15 shows the results of the testing related to the formative portion of the 
model. Similar to the model testing in Chapter 2, the path coefficients shown in the table 
offer evidence that the dimensions contributed similarly to the Shareholder Inequity 
construct. However, with these data, the Blockholder Power construct was slightly more 
influential than the Differential Control and Absence of Board Neutrality constructs, 
while the Organizational Slack construct still had the least influence. These findings are 
not surprising or detrimental to the Shareholder Inequity model since no assumptions 
were (or should be) made regarding the relative contributions of each underlying 
dimension. Each dimension was still highly significant in the model and contributed 




coefficients in the Chapter 2 data and the path coefficients shown in Table 15.14 Further 
testing offered evidence that the constructs exhibited acceptable levels of 
multicollinearity since the VIF scores were below the threshold value of 5. Additionally 
all underlying constructs exhibited significant relationships with the Shareholder Inequity 
construct.  
Table 15: Paths, Multicollinearity, and Significance 
Construct Path Coefficients  VIF Significance 
OrgSlack .362 1.188 p<.0001 
BlockPower .440 1.231 p<.0001 
DiffControl .370 1.03 p<.0001 
AbsenceNeutralBO
D 
.395 1.154 p<.0001 
 
Table 16 shows the loadings and significance of each measured variable. The 
loadings were similar to the Chapter 2 results. The measured variables’ relative 
contribution to their associated construct was the same and all loadings were above the 
required .4 level, leading to the conclusion that the measured variables exhibited 
significant relationships with their construct (Hair et al., 2014). 
Table 16: Loadings and Significance 




DivPay .934       p<.0001 
FinSlack .487       p<.0001 
LargestBlock   .947     p<.0001 
BlockDiff   .928     p<.0001 
DualClass     .504   p<.0001 
InsideOwn     .955   p<.0001 
AffilDirector       .886 p<.0001 
ModDuality       .761 p<.0001 
 
                                                 




Once the model for secondary agency conflict was further validated with the new 
dataset, the acquisition event study was the next step. The measures for Shareholder 
Inequity and the underlying constructs15 were collected for the year prior to the 
acquisition announcement to show that the levels of secondary agency conflict influence 
acquisition decisions. Control variables that were included in related research were also 
incorporated into the regression equations to further isolate the constructs of interest.16 
The complete set of tested variables is presented in Appendix A and further explained in 
the next section. Accounting data were collected from Compustat, stock return data from 
CRSP, and acquisition data from Capital IQ; then matched by a unique identifier that 
included the ticker symbol and announcement date.  
3.4.2 Variables 
Dependent variable. 
The dependent variable, investor reaction, was operationalized as cumulative 
abnormal return (CAR) over the course of a time period that extended from two days 
prior to the announcement, the announcement day, and two days after the announcement 
(Humphery-Jenner, 2014). The five-day CAR is the most commonly used time period 
since it is short enough to avoid confounding events, but long enough to allow for 
information leakage and reaction time (Schijven & Hitt, 2012). The following process 
was used to calculate each event’s CAR (Chen & Young, 2010): 
1. Collected the daily stock prices for each acquirer during the event window t−2 
to t+2 (i.e., the announcement day, two days before, and two days after the 
announcement).  
                                                 
15 As explained previously in Chapter 2 and below in the Independent Variables section. 




2. Collected the CRSP equally-weighted return (from the standard market 
model) to calculate the cumulative abnormal returns (Brown & Warner, 
1985). The announcement date was coded as t0 and the market model 
parameters were estimated over the period from 210 days before to 11 days 
before the announcement day to show the normal stock market price 
fluctuations of the acquiring firm (Masulis et al., 2007). 
3. Calculated the abnormal return each day for each acquiring firm j as: 
ARj,t = Rj,t − (α + β × Rm,t), 
Where: ARj,t was the abnormal return,  
      Rj,t was the acquiring firm’s daily stock return,  
      (α + β × Rm,t) represents the 200 (-210, -11) day holdout period, 
                              Rm,t was the daily stock market return, 
      β was the beta or market-adjusted variance in firm stock returns, 
      α is the rate of return for the firm when Rm,t is 0 
4. Summated the daily abnormal returns during the five-day period (−2, +2) 
surrounding the acquisition announcement to get the CAR. 
Independent variables. 
The independent variables for the study (Organizational Slack, Blockholder 
Power, Differential Control, and Absence of Board Neutrality) are the unobservable 
constructs that were tested and validated for the preceding chapter. The constructs were 
described at length in Chapter 2 and are summarized in Appendix A. Each of the 
secondary agency constructs was operationalized as the latent variable score from the 
CFA procedures explained in Chapter 2. The latent variable scores produced by the PLS-




of the related measured variables (Hair et al., 2014). The Organizational Slack construct 
represents the differing shareholder preferences in a firm and is a composite of the firm’s 
dividend payout ratio (Yoshikawa & Rasheed, 2010) and the financial slack percentage 
(Kim et al., 2008). Blockholder Power represents the influence of the blockholders in the 
organization and is a composite of the percentage held by the largest shareholder 
(Renders & Gaeremynck, 2012) and a dummy variable that represents the ownership 
difference between the largest and second largest shareholders (Renders & Gaeremynck, 
2012). Differential Control represents owners that have additional power over the 
strategic direction of the firm and is a composite of a dual share class dummy (Renders & 
Gaeremynck, 2012) and the percentage owned by insiders (Deutsch, Keil, & Laamanen, 
2011). Absence of Board Neutrality represents the extent of bias for various owners that 
hinder the monitoring capabilities of the board and is a composite of the percentage of 
affiliated directors (Deutsch et al., 2011) and an extended CEO duality measure (Su, Xu, 
& Phan, 2008). The Shareholder Inequity construct is a composite of each of the above 
dimensions of secondary agency conflict that represents deviations from the one-share 
one-vote conceptualization of firm ownership.  
The moderating variable, unrelated acquisitions, was dummy coded for 
objectivity and replicability (Miller et al., 2010). Unrelated, or diversifying acquisitions, 
are transactions where the acquirer and target operate in different industries. Unrelated 
acquisition was operationalized as a dummy variable coded 1 if 3-digit SIC codes (of the 
acquirer and target firm) did not match or 0 if they did match (Miller et al., 2010).  
Control variables. 
The first set of control variables that were included represents primary agency 




agency problems are of two types: primary and secondary. When the owner-manager 
(primary) conflicts are controlled, the owner-owner (secondary) conflicts will still 
remain. To control for primary agency conflicts, both the Bebchuk, Cohen, and Farrell 
(BCF) index of six anti-takeover provisions (Bebchuk, Cohen, & Farrell, 2009; 
Humphery-Jenner, 2014) and a dummy variable representing firms with classified boards 
(Masulis et al., 2007; Harford et al., 2012) were included in the models. A firm’s BCF 
score ranges from 0-6 and is an additive measure of the number of anti-takeover 
provisions that the firm employs. Anti-takeover provision measures have been employed 
in similar studies to proxy for managerial entrenchment and primary agency problems 
(Masulis et al., 2007). Higher numbers of the anti-takeover provisions represent firms 
with greater agency conflict (Harford et al., 2012; Masulis et al., 2007). The same studies 
also employ a dummy variable that identifies the firm’s use of classified boards (to 
protect managers from takeovers) to proxy for primary agency conflict (Bebchuk et al., 
2009).  
Following extant literature, various accounting measures related to the acquiring 
firm were also included as control variables (Masulis et al., 2007). The acquirer controls 
included in the regressions were leverage, firm size, Tobin’s Q, and free cash flow. 
Leverage, firm size, Tobin’s Q, and free cash flow were also measured at the fiscal year-
end prior to the acquisition announcement (Harford et al., 2012). Leverage was the book 
value of total debt divided by the market value of total assets. Masulis et al. (2007) 
showed leverage to have a positive effect on CAR and suggested that the effect stems 
from the limited managerial discretion and the protections from takeovers when firms are 
highly leveraged. Firm size was measured as the log of the number of employees (Luo, 




(2004) provided evidence that the bidder’s size was negatively related to their M&A 
announcement CAR. Tobin’s Q was measured as the ratio of the acquirer’s market value 
of assets over its book value of assets and was expected to be negatively related to the 
CAR (Masulis et al., 2007). Controls were also established for the amount of free cash 
flow available to firm decision makers since the market reacts more negatively to firms 
with more cash on hand (Masulis et al., 2007). The free cash flow variable was 
operationalized as the firm’s cash and short-term investments divided by the total assets 
(Kim & Bettis, 2014).  
Additional controls were added for firm acquisition strategies and the details of 
the announced acquisition. The first was the year of the announcement (Masulis et al., 
2007). The form of payment proposed by the acquiring firm has also been shown to 
influence the announcement reactions (Masulis et al., 2007). Acquisitions financed with 
firm equity experience greater negative reaction than cash payments for the transaction. 
Therefore, a dummy variable was included for payment terms, coded as 1 for all cash 
payments and 0 otherwise (Masulis et al., 2007). Additional evidence shows different 
investor reactions in regard to the type of target (Schijven & Hitt, 2012). Shareholders 
tend to react more positively to acquisitions of private firms (Harford et al., 2012). 
Therefore a dummy variable was included to account for this detail; coded as 1 for 
private targets and 0 if public. The relationship between the acquirer and the target is also 
a consideration for shareholders. Investors prefer a friendly relationship between the 
acquiring and target firms over a hostile situation and therefore a dummy variable was 
included that was coded as 1 for friendly relationships and 0 otherwise (Goranova et al., 
2010). The frequency of acquisitions within a given firm was also controlled since 




and their shareholders would be less likely to have negative reactions to announced 
acquisitions (Aktas et al., 2011; Laamanen & Keil, 2008). The variable was coded as 1 
when the acquirer averaged more than one announced acquisition per year within the 
sample period and 0 otherwise (Laamanen & Keil, 2008). The relative size of the 
announced acquisition also factors into the market reaction. When the announced 
acquisition requires a larger percentage of firm resources, investors more frequently 
question the value of the decision (Masulis et al., 2007). The relative size of the 
announced acquisition was measured as the deal value in proportion to the market value 
of equity (Humphery-Jenner, 2014). The industry relatedness, at the 3-digit SIC code, of 
the acquirer and target was also included as a dummy variable coded 1 if the codes were 
different and 0 if they were the same (Miller et al., 2010).17 Acquisition announcements 
that are diversifying in nature are viewed more negatively by shareholders (Masulis et al., 
2007). Lastly, the regressions included a high-tech dummy variable for announcements 
involving two high-tech firms;18 coded as 1 when both target and acquiring firms were 
technology related and 0 when not (Humphery-Jenner, 2014; Loughran & Ritter, 2004). 
When two high-tech firms are involved in an acquisition announcement, there exists a 
positive effect on CAR (Masulis et al., 2007). The summary of variables included in the 
statistical testing are presented in Appendix 1, but the abbreviations and summary 
statistics for the employed variables are shown in Table 17. The independent variables 
(Organizational Slack, Blockholder Power, Differential Control, Absence of Board 
                                                 
17 The industry relatedness has no hypothesized relationships in the first five regressions. Instead, it is 
included only as a control variable (Humphery-Jenner, 2014; Miller et al., 2010). In Hypothesis 6, the 
industry relatedness is tested more directly as an interaction with Shareholder Inequity.   
18 Loughran and Ritter (2004) define high-tech firms as firms in the following industry SIC codes: 
computer hardware (3571, 3572, 3575, 3577, 3578); communications equipment (3661, 3663, 3669); 
electronics (3671, 3672, 3674, 3675, 3677, 3678, 3679); navigation equipment (3812); measuring and 
controlling devices (3823, 3825, 3826, 3827, 3829); medical instruments (3841, 3845); telephone 





Neutrality, and Shareholder Inequity) are not included in Table 17 because latent variable 
scores produced from PLS-SEM have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. There 
was no missing data in the final dataset and therefore the n is 673 for all variables.  
Table 17: Summary Statistics of Measured Variables 
Variable Abbreviation Mean Std. Deviation 
Cumulative 
abnormal return 
CAR -.001 .012 
Agency index BCF 2.570 1.317 
Classified Board CLASSBOD .450 .498 
Tobin’s Q TOBINQ 2.076 1.012 
Leverage LEV .280 .160 
Firm size FIRMSIZE 2.262 1.719 
Free cash flow FCF .194 .168 
Payment method PAYCASH .590 .492 
Target type BUYPRIV .940 .242 
Deal attitude FRIEND .980 .143 
Announcement 
pattern of acquirer 
SERACQ .400 .490 
Relative deal size RELDEALSZ .297 .545 
Diversifying DIVERSE3 .560 .497 
 
The correlations between the most important measures are presented in Table 18 
and a full correlation matrix is presented in Appendix 2. All of the dimensions of 
secondary agency conflict and the composite Shareholder Inequity measure were 
negatively correlated with the announcement returns except for Organizational Slack. 
The positive correlation may be explained by the need to retain larger amounts of liquid 
assets (fewer dividend payouts and more financial slack) leading up to a time of strategic 
change (Uysal, 2011). The correlation between Differential Control and CAR was 
significant at the .01 level. The interaction term of Shareholder Inequity and diversifying 




CAR. The findings offer preliminary evidence of statistical relationships with CAR. Also 
interesting was the negative correlation between several of the secondary agency 
constructs and the primary agency proxies.19 The negative correlations imply a possible 
trade-off between primary agency and secondary agency problems. Additionally, Table 
18 offers further evidence that Shareholder Inequity has a significant relationship with 
each underlying dimension. To avoid statistical problems resulting from the high 
correlations between the secondary agency dimensions and Shareholder Inequity, each 
construct was tested in separate regressions in order to assess the resulting market 
reactions. The high correlations between Shareholder Inequity (and some underlying 
dimensions) as well as the Unrelated variable in the table is a consequence of the 
construction of the variable for the interactions tested in Hypothesis 6. 



















CAR 1               
Org 
Slack 
.057 1 . 
 
.       
Block 
Power 
-.006 .090*  1          
Diff 
Control 




-.071  .160**  .246** .348**  1       
Share 
Inequity 
-.062 .481** .693** .671** .690** 1     
Un 
Related 
-.083* .321** .482** .578** .530** .751** 1   
BCF .003 -.009 -.094* -.172** .004 -.107** -.066 1 
CLASS 
BOD 
-.065 -.014 -.021 .022 .062 .018 .015 .533** 
**Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed) and *Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed). 
                                                 
19ANOVA analysis offered further evidence that proxies for primary agency were significantly different 
from the composite measures of secondary agency (F-value of 2.040 for BCF and 1.741 for Classified 




3.4.3 Analyses  
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression was employed to test each of the 
proposed hypotheses. OLS is still the most frequently used technique in management 
research (Wiersema & Bowen, 2009) and is appropriate for statistical models with 
continuous dependent variables (Hair et al., 2010). OLS estimations predict the 
dependent variable, investor reaction (CAR), for each observation in the data by setting 
regression weights to minimize residuals. OLS regression provides a single predicted 
value of the dependent variable regardless of the number of independent variables so that 
all of the individual and cumulative effects will be manifested.  
The predictive power (R2) of the models was low when compared to the majority 
of published studies in management literature, but comparable to other short- term market 
event studies (Chen & Young, 2012; Duchin & Schmidt, 2013; Humphrey-Jenner, 2014; 
Masulis et al., 2007). The efficient market hypothesis explains that the market is simply 
unpredictable (Fama, 1970) and therefore “the low R2 in many tests of short-run market 
efficiency are neither surprising nor interesting” (Schiller, 2014, p. 1491). Any stock 
return predictability, no matter how low, represents opportunities to “beat” the market 
and is therefore relevant and useful (Schiller, 2014).   
The first tested equations, Hypotheses 1 and 2, involved the isolation of the 
Organizational Slack and Blockholder Power dimensions of secondary agency problems 
and the associated control variables. The regression results are shown in Table 19. 
Hypothesis 1, which explained the relationship between Organizational Slack and CAR, 
was not significant. Since the Organizational Slack construct includes measures for the 
dividend payout ratio and financial slack, an argument could be made that shareholders 




opportunities (Kim et al., 2008). Similar findings regarding free cash flows have been 
presented in the primary agency literature. For example, Masulis et al. (2007) found a 
positive relationship between available cash and announcement returns and explained that 
higher free cash flows can proxy for better recent firm performance and indicate that the 
firm is pursuing valuable opportunities as opposed to expropriating minority shareholder 
wealth. Therefore, Organizational Slack may not represent a problem to shareholders 
during times of strategic change unless the high slack levels are combined with the other 
dimensions of secondary agency conflict.  
Hypothesis 2, which explained the relationship between Blockholder Power and 
CAR, was found to be insignificant as well. The Blockholder Power construct included 
measures for the largest shareholder and the differential between the largest and second 
largest shareholders. As explained by Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach (2009), certain types of 
blockholders and those with managerial or board control are more likely to manipulate 
policies or changes. In the absence of the other dimensions of secondary agency conflict, 
Blockholder Power may not be sufficient to expropriate wealth. 
In addition, the findings related to Hypotheses 1 and 2 may show evidence of the 
trade-off that shareholders experience between primary and secondary agency conflicts 
(Edmans, 2013). In both models the classified board dummy (CLASSBOD) that 
represented primary agency conflict was negative and significant. The Organizational 
Slack and Blockholder Power dimensions alone were viewed negatively by shareholders, 
but were less influential than primary agency measures on the dependent variable, CAR. 
This suggested that shareholders were more concerned about managerial expropriation 
than blockholder expropriation when the first two dimensions of secondary agency 




Of the remaining included control variables, only the free cash flow (FCF), the 
relative deal size (RELDEALSZ), and the high-tech firm dummy (HIGHTECH) were 
significant in the equations. The control variables that represented the acquirer’s 
characteristics had mixed results. Leverage and firm size (while not being significant) 
performed as expected. Greater levels of debt had a positive effect on CAR and firm size 
was negatively related to CAR. The effects of Tobin’s Q and free cash flow were 
opposite to that predicted. The relationships between CAR and Tobin’s Q were expected 
to be negative based on the Masulis et al. (2007) study. But, more recent studies have 
shown a positive relationship with CAR (Humphery-Jenner, 2014). Since Tobin’s Q and 
free cash flow both represent the availability of growth opportunities, presumably 
shareholders feel more comfortable with acquisitions announced when there are available 
resources (Peng, Wei, & Yang, 2011). Although different than expected, the free cash 
flow directionality aligns with findings from similar research (Masulis et al., 2007). 
The relationships of relative deal size (RELDEALSIZE) and the high-tech 
identifier (HIGHTECH) were significant and the directionality was as expected. The 
directionality of the payment type (PAYCASH) and target type (BUYPRIV) control 
variables was the opposite of predictions. Findings from Masulis et al., 2009 offer 
evidence that the interaction of payment type and target type determines the 
directionality. Investor reactions to announcements involving the acquisition of a private 
company and financed with stock are viewed positively, but the acquisition of a private 
company with cash produces a negative reaction (Masulis et al., 2009). Schijven and Hitt 
(2012) showed that acquisitions financed with cash changed the relationship between 
acquisition premiums and CAR, suggesting that the acquisition premium (not measured 




Humphery-Jenner (2014) showed that industry had an effect on the relationship between 
the type of firm and the market reaction to acquisition announcements. Specifically, 
investors reacted negatively when the target was a private high-tech firm (Humphery-
Jenner, 2014). Neither payment type nor target type were significant in the equations. The 
control variables addressing the other deal characteristics: announcement year 
(ANNCYR), serial acquisition strategy (SERACQ), attitude (FRIENDLY), and 
diversification (DIVERSE3), performed as predicted from prior research (as explained 
previously in the description of control variables). The base model and regression 


































Table 19: Regression Results for Hypotheses 1 and 2 
  
Base Model Hypothesis 1 Hypothesis 2 
Beta T-Value Beta T-Value Beta T-Value 
OrgSlack 
 
  -.002 -.050 
 
  
BlockPower         -.021 -.540 
(Constant)   1.426   1.425   1.482 
BCF .048 1.051 .048 1.015 .045 .978 
CLASSBOD -.078 -1.693* -.078 -1.702* -.078 -1.685* 
TOBINQ .053 1.043 .053 1.027 .055 1.076 
LEV .068 1.202 .068 1.204 .069 1.218 
FIRMSIZE -.018 -.380 -.019 -.367 -.020 -.420 
FCF .097 2.045** .097 1.980** .096 2.027** 
ANNCYR -.057 -1.434 -.057 -1.449 -.059 -1.490 
PAYCASH -.044 -1.021 -.044 -1.025 -.046 -1.047 
BUYPRIV -.054 -1.362 -.054 -1.363 -.054 -1.350 
FRIEND .019 .475 .019 .458 .019 .472 
SERACQ .011 .253 .011 .256 .009 .219 
RELDEALSZ -.076 -1.748* -.076 -1.743* -.075 -1.742* 
DIVERSE3 -.030 -.748 -.030 -.865 -.030 -.754 
BOTHTECH .082 1.971** .082 2.014** .082 1.985** 
F-Value   2.131***   1.986**   2.019** 
R2   4.364   4.365   4.446 
Adjusted R2   2.329   2.249   2.224 
Change in R2       .000   .000 
Notes: In the models presented, the dependent variable is CAR. Statistical significance is indicated as: * p < .10, ** p < 
.05, *** p < .01, respectively.  
Hypothesis 3, which explained the relationship between Differential Control and 
CAR, had a significant and negative relationship as predicted. These results are provided 
in Table 20. The Differential Control dimension of secondary agency conflict was a 
composite of insider ownership and dual class shares. The variables in the regression 
equation explained 6.1% of the market reaction to an acquisition announcement and 
resulted in a T-Value of -3.462, which represented significance with a p-value of less 
than .0001. These findings showed that shareholders reacted negatively to acquirers that 




Additionally, the results also suggested that shareholders may view the Differential 
Control dimension of secondary agency conflicts as being more detrimental than primary 
agency problems in an acquisition announcement context.     
Hypothesis 4, which tested the relationship between the Absence of Board 
Neutrality and CAR, was also negative and significant. The Absence of Board Neutrality 
dimension was a composite of the percentage of affiliated directors and a modified 
duality measure that incorporated both the ownership and board positions of the firm’s 
CEO. The variables in this regression equation explained 5.225% of the market reaction 
to an acquisition announcement and resulted in a T-Value of -2.401, which represented 
significance with a p-value of .017. Similarly to the effects of the Differential Control 
dimension described earlier, shareholders had negative reactions to firms that exhibited 
greater levels of the Absence of Board Neutrality dimension of secondary agency 
conflict. Also notable was that once again, primary agency concerns appeared less 
influential than secondary agency conflicts when acquisitions were announced.  
The control variables again exhibited the same directionality and similar levels of 
influence on the market reaction to announced acquisitions that were described in the 
earlier section explaining Hypotheses 1 and 2. One notable exception involved the 
significance of relative deal size (RELDEALSIZE), suggesting that the deal size became 
less important to shareholders when they believed that secondary agency conflicts may 
have played a part in the strategic decision to acquire. Additionally, the constant and 
announcement year (ANNCYR) became significant in Hypothesis 4 regression. This may 
represent the changing trends in board structure over the time period studied, but further 
investigation would be necessary to fully determine the underlying reasons for this 




related to the Differential Control and the Absence of Board Neutrality dimensions of 
secondary agency conflict.  
Table 20: Regression Results for Hypotheses 3 and 4 
  Base Model Hypothesis 3 Hypothesis 4 
 
Beta T-Value Beta T-Value Beta T-Value 
DiffControl 
 
  -.137 3.462*** 
 
  
AbsenceNeutralBOD         -.101 -2.401** 
(Constant)   1.426   1.549   1.784* 
BCF .048 1.051 .011 .208 .038 .834 
CLASSBOD -.078 -1.693* -.061 -1.332 -.076 -1.659* 
TOBINQ .053 1.043 .048 .938 .052 1.018 
LEV .068 1.202 .050 .883 .058 1.034 
FIRMSIZE -.018 -.380 -.031 -.608 -.056 -1.110 
FCF .097 2.045** .083 1.770* .089 1.888* 
ANNCYR -.057 -1.434 -.060 -1.555 -.071 -1.790* 
PAYCASH -.044 -1.021 -.049 -1.153 -.046 -1.067 
BUYPRIV -.054 -1.362 -.045 -1.134 -.045 -1.143 
FRIEND .019 .475 .019 .464 .015 .393 
SERACQ .011 .253 .004 .089 .011 .266 
RELDEALSZ -.076 -1.748* -.068 -1.597 -.070 -1.617 
DIVERSE3 -.030 -.748 -.022 -.551 -.020 -.496 
BOTHTECH .082 1.971** .088 2.144** .087 2.100** 
F-Value   2.131***   2.821***   2.388*** 
R2   4.364   6.100   5.225 
Adjusted R2   2.329   3.957   3.044 
Change in R2   
 
  1.736   0.821 
Notes: In the models presented, the dependent variable is CAR. Statistical significance is indicated as: * p < .10, ** p < 
.05, *** p < .01, respectively.  
 The next regression equation included all the prior controls and the new 
composite measure of secondary agency conflict, Shareholder Inequity. These results are 
presented in Table 21. Hypothesis 5 predicted a negative and significant relationship 
between the market reaction to an announced acquisition and secondary agency conflicts. 




significant at the .01 level. The regression equation explained 5.337% of the variation in 
the market reaction. 
Considering that the market is unpredictable (Fama, 1970), the contribution of 
secondary agency conflicts to the market reaction of announced acquisitions is both 
statistically and economically significant. The regression results show that, on average, 
acquirers that exhibited the characteristics associated with greater secondary agency 
problems had announcement returns that were approximately 1.1% lower than those that 
did not. Masulis et al. (2007) offered evidence that firms exhibiting primary agency 
characteristics experienced a .524% lower return, which represented a $30 million loss of 
shareholder value. The regressions tested in this study showed that the contribution of 
secondary agency problems to the market reaction may represent double that amount 
(i.e., after controlling for the effects of primary agency issues).  
The significance of Shareholder Inequity showed that secondary agency concerns 
involved a combination of dimensions. Some of the dimensions (OrgSlack and 
BlockPower) were not significant alone, but became highly significant when shareholders 
believed they were combined with greater blockholder control over firm decisions 
(DiffControl and AbsenceNeutralBOD). This finding further validates the necessity of a 














Table 21: Regression Results for Hypothesis 5  
  
Base Model Hypothesis 5 
Beta T-Value Beta T-Value 
ShareInequity 
 
  -.109 -2.589*** 
(Constant)   1.426   1.759* 
BCF .048 1.051 .025 .528 
CLASSBOD -.078 -1.693* -.072 -1.571 
TOBINQ .053 1.043 .051 1.009 
LEV .068 1.202 .061 1.076 
FIRMSIZE -.018 -.380 -.053 -1.053 
FCF .097 2.045** .102 2.166** 
ANNCYR -.057 -1.434 -.070 -1.765* 
PAYCASH -.044 -1.021 -.049 -1.140 
BUYPRIV -.054 -1.362 -.046 -1.162 
FRIEND .019 .475 .016 .408 
SERACQ .011 .253 .007 .177 
RELDEALSZ -.076 -1.748* -.069 -1.606 
DIVERSE3 -.030 -.748 -.024 -.602 
BOTHTECH .082 1.971** .091 2.190** 
F-Value   2.131***   2.469*** 
R2   4.364   5.337 
Adjusted R2   2.329   3.175 
Change in R2      1.000 
Notes: In the model presented, the dependent variable is CAR. Statistical significance is indicated as: * p < .10, ** p < 
.05, *** p < .01, respectively.  
 
Hypothesis 6 examined the impact of acquisition relatedness (measured at the 3-
digit SIC code) on the shareholder returns (i.e., CAR) of firms exhibiting secondary 
agency problems, represented by the new Shareholder Inequity measure. The interaction 
of Shareholder Inequity and DIVERSE3 was predicted to be negatively related to 
announcement returns.  The relationship between the interaction term, Unrelated (i.e., 
DIVERSE3 X ShareInequity), and CAR in the regression, while negative, was not 
significant as expected. Therefore, Hypothesis 6 did not receive support as shown in 




Table 22: Regression Results for Hypothesis 6  





Beta T-Value Beta T-Value Beta T-Value 
Unrelated         -.062 -1.057 
(Constant)   1.426   1.759*   1.720* 
BCF .048 1.051 .025 .528 .025 .543 
CLASSBOD -.078 -1.693* -.072 -1.571 -.073 -1.585 
TOBINQ .053 1.043 .051 1.009 .049 .955 
LEV .068 1.202 .061 1.076 .056 .983 
FIRMSIZE -.018 -.380 -.053 -1.053 -.053 -1.059 
FCF .097 2.045** .102 2.166** .100 2.133** 
ANNCYR -.057 -1.434 -.070 -1.765* -.068 -1.725* 
PAYCASH -.044 -1.021 -.049 -1.140 -.050 -1.149 
BUYPRIV -.054 -1.362 -.046 -1.162 -.046 -1.169 
FRIEND .019 .475 .016 .408 .015 .370 
SERACQ .011 .253 .007 .177 .007 .166 
RELDEALSZ -.076 -1.748* -.069 -1.606 -.068 -1.574 
BOTHTECH .082 1.971** -.109 -2.190** .086 2.064** 
DIVERSE3 -.030 -.748 -.024 -.602 -.025 -.623 
ShareInequity   -.109 -2.589*** -.063 -1.037 
F-Value   
2.131**
* 
  2.453***   
2.370**
* 
R2   4.364   5.300   5.500 
Adjusted R2   2.329   3.090   3.245 
Change in R2   
 
  1.736   0.821 
Notes: In the models presented, the dependent variable is CAR. Statistical significance is indicated as: * p < .10, ** p < 
.05, *** p < .01, respectively.  
However, the relationship was visually examined by plotting the regression 
between CAR and Shareholder Inequity under two varying conditions of diversification 
relatedness, related or unrelated. The trends in the two plots (shown in Figure 4) offered 
some evidence of the hypothesized relationships. As is evident from the two plots, the 
slopes of both the lines are negative. Therefore, shareholder returns (i.e., CAR) decreased 
with increased Shareholder Inequity when company announced diversifying acquisitions 




different slopes of the two plots in Figure 4 indicated, this decrease in CAR was greater 
when the firm was pursuing unrelated diversification (as compared to related 
diversification). This result provided visual confirmation of the relationships proposed in 
Hypothesis 6. 
Figure 4: Acquisition Relatedness and Shareholder Inequity 
 
 
Several additional tests and robustness checks were incorporated into the analysis. 
The results were robust to multicollinearity. The tolerance and VIF levels were checked 
in each equation and the values for all variables were below the acceptable limits. The T-
statistics presented are based on standard errors that have been adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity (White, 1980). The reported findings held when the sample was tested 
without the duplicate firm-years (610 remaining). The findings also held when a control 
variable was added that differentiates whether the sampled announcement is the first or 

















The relationships were also tested using a different analytical method, PLS-SEM. 
The results held for all hypotheses with both methods. Additionally, the results held when 
all hypotheses were retested with a different event window for announcement returns. 
The dependent variable, CAR was re-calculated with a 3-day event window (-1, 1) and 
the hypotheses were re-tested arriving at the same conclusions. The dimensions 
(independent variables) of secondary agency conflict were represented by the latent 
variable scores that were created with PLS-SEM and then used in regression equations 
both independently and holistically through the Shareholder Inequity construct. The 
interaction variable, that multiplied the Shareholder Inequity construct and the 
diversifying dummy variable, was tested employing both a 2-digit and 3-digit SIC code to 
measure diversification. None of the results for any of the six hypotheses (1-6) changed 
from the robustness analyses. 
Additional testing was performed to compare the new Shareholder Inequity 
measure with Renders and Gaeremynck’s (2012) conflict index. The factor score for the 
conflict index is significantly correlated, .7210, with Shareholder Inequity. Since there 
existed significant correlation, further regression testing was deemed important to 
illustrate the difference between the two measures of secondary agency problems. The 
regression testing showed that while Shareholder Inequity is significantly related to CAR, 
the conflict index is not. The regression results employing the two different measures are 
presented in Table 23. 
Table 23: Regression Results for Shareholder Inequity and the Conflict Index  
  
Shareholder Inequity Conflict Index 
Beta T-Value Beta T-Value 
ShareInequity -.109 -2.589***   
Conflict Index   -.030 -.757 




BCF .025 .528  .942 
CLASSBOD -.072 -1.571  -1.680* 
TOBINQ .051 1.009  1.088 
LEV .061 1.076  1.225 
FIRMSIZE -.053 -1.053  -.440 
FCF .102 2.166**  2.021** 
ANNCYR -.070 -1.765*  -1.521 
PAYCASH -.049 -1.140  -1.062 
BUYPRIV -.046 -1.162  -1.342 
FRIEND .016 .408  .469 
SERACQ .007 .177  .214 
RELDEALSZ -.069 -1.606  -1.739* 
DIVERSE3 -.024 -.602  -.758 
BOTHTECH .091 2.190**  1.992** 
F-Value   2.469***  2.131*** 
R2   5.337  4.421 
Adjusted R2   3.175  2.213 
Change in R2    1.000  1.000 
Notes: In the model presented, the dependent variable is CAR. Statistical significance is indicated as: * p < .10, ** p < 
.05, *** p < .01, respectively. The change in R2 shown in this table represents the difference from the base model.  
 
3.5 SUMMARY, CONTRIBUTIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
3.5.1 Summary 
This chapter discussed the first empirical tests of the new secondary agency 
constructs that were identified, defined, and analyzed in the first two chapters of this 
dissertation. The final step for validation of new constructs was to apply them to a 
specific context as reported in the current chapter (Hair et al., 2010). The research 
reported in Chapter 3 produced results that further established the validity of the overall 
measure of Shareholder Inequity. Hypotheses 1 and 2 were rejected, but evidence was 
presented that when used in combination with the other dimensions, Shareholder Inequity 
produced significant relationships. Tests of Hypotheses 3 and 5 both indicated 




statistically supported, but the visual evidence presented allows for a greater 
understanding of the relationships. The interaction variable was not significant, but the 
regression plots showed that unrelated diversification augmented the negative 
relationship between CAR and Shareholder Inequity.  
3.5.2 Contributions  
The study presented above further validated the composite measure, Shareholder 
Inequity, which is an important contribution to research that has sought to investigate the 
latent conflicts among principals. The insignificance of some dimensions when tested 
alone offers further evidence of the necessity of employing a composite measure to fully 
assess secondary agency conflicts in a firm. Additional testing showed that a prior 
measure of secondary agency problems was significantly correlated with Shareholder 
Inequity, but was not significant in the regression equations. 
A few previous studies have investigated the problems among certain types of 
principals and their involvement in acquisition activities, but they did not examine all of 
the dimensions of secondary agency problems in combination (e.g., Chen & Young, 
2010; Goranova et al., 2010; Miller et al., 2010). The conflicts among certain types of 
owners have been examined in acquisition contexts, but they were limited to family 
(Miller et al., 2010), institutions (Goranova et al., 2010), and government (Chen & 
Young, 2010) blockholders. These earlier studies of secondary agency conflict produced 
important findings, but the minority shareholders in a firm had not been included to 
examine the conflicts holistically. The study presented here offers findings related to 
many shareholder types, including minority owners.  
The study also contributes to the knowledge surrounding event studies that 




results offered evidence that investors acted on the new information provided by the 
decision to acquire and the details of the acquisition (Schijven & Hitt, 2012). Investors 
clearly recognized and accounted for secondary agency conflicts in firms and exhibited a 
particularly strong reaction to firms that had differential control structures and director 
biases. Additionally, the composite measure that included all the facets of secondary 
agency problems was associated with a significant negative market reaction to acquisition 
announcements. When the announced acquisition was diversifying in nature, and 
therefore more likely to destroy shareholder value, there was some evidence that firms 
with secondary agency problems were more likely to experience a reduction in stock 
price. 
In contrast to the historical assumptions that all owners pursued profit 
maximization (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), the research presented here offered evidence 
that firm owners often had conflicting goals and were not always solely focused on 
enhancing firm value (Young et al., 2008). Additional evidence produced some 
preliminary insights as to relationship between primary and secondary agency conflicts. 
Shareholder Inequity and the BCF index (representative of primary agency conflicts) 
were significantly negatively correlated, showing some evidence of a trade-off.  
Regression results showed that managers of publicly listed firms may not be 
choosing strategy independently as assumed in primary agency research (Masulis et al., 
2007). Instead, investors may believe that blockholders with additional control were 
driving acquisition strategy and that the board of directors may not be fully representing 
the interests of all shareholders equally (Barclay & Holderness, 1989; Villalonga & Amit, 
2009). While the evidence is not conclusive, the regressions that employed the same set 




that secondary agency conflict may be more important to shareholders in the context of 
acquisition announcements.  
The research offers some practical insights as well. Investors should be aware of 
the conflicting goals and interests among shareholders in publicly traded firms. 
Shareholders should attempt to identify the firms that exhibit characteristics of secondary 
agency conflict and perhaps more carefully monitor their individual goal alignment with 
those of the blockholders who may influence or control firm decisions. Similarly, they 
should also note that blockholders’ relationships with board members may impact firm 
strategies.    
3.5.3 Limitations and Future Research 
There are a few limitations of this study. Each limitation has a corresponding 
extension suggested for future research. As noted in the prior chapter, many studies 
encourage researchers to consider the “type” of owner or group of owners (e.g., Chen & 
Young, 2010; Cronqvist & Fahlenbrach, 2009). Ownership type was not considered in 
the acquisition announcement models as it was beyond the scope of the dissertation. 
Hence, an extension of this research that includes ownership type is encouraged. For 
instance, researchers could investigate these phenomena in family firms, institutionally-
owned firms, or firms with various other ownership structures.  
This study only investigated the short term market reaction to acquisition 
announcements. Future research that considers how the conflicts among principals affect 
the post-acquisition integration process and long-term performance would be valuable 
and interesting as well.  
The conclusions presented are limited to publicly traded firms in the U.S. Future 




ownership structures, laws, and political pressures. As noted in the Methods section 
above, the correlations between primary and secondary agency may indicate trade-offs 
between the two types of agency problems and research into these relationships should 
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Variable Description Reference 
 





Five-day cumulative abnormal return (in percentage points 
from t-2 through t+2)  
CRSP 






Latent variable score from the CFA of dividend payout 
ratio and financial slack 





Latent variable score from the CFA of the % held by the 
largest shareholder and a dummy representing the 
differential between the top two blockholders 





Latent variable score from the CFA of dual class dummy 
and % owned by insiders 





Latent variable score from the CFA of % affiliated 









Latent variable score from the CFA of the underlying 
dimensions 















CLASSBOD Dummy variable: 1 for classified board, 0 if not Capital IQ 




Tobin’s Q TOBINQ Market Value of Assets/Book Value of Assets Compustat 
Masulis et al. 
(2007) 
                                                 




  Leverage LEV Book value of Debt/Market value of Assets Compustat 




Firm Size* FIRMSIZE Ln of the # of Employees Compustat 
Luo, Kanuri, & 




FCF Cash and Short Term Investments/Total Assets Compustat 






ANNCYR Year of acquisition announcement Capital IQ 







Dummy variable: 1 for all cash, 0 otherwise Capital IQ 






Dummy Variable: 1 when target is a private firm and 0 if 
the target is a public firm 
Capital IQ 





FRIEND Dummy Variable: 1 when the deal is friendly and 0 if not Capital IQ 






Dummy variable: 1 if average more than 1 acquisition per 
year and 0 if not  
Capital IQ 





RELDEALSIZE Deal Value/Market Value of Equity 
Capital IQ 
Compustat 




Three Digit SIC* 
DIVERSE3 
Dummy Variable: 1 when target and acquirer have 
different 3-digit SIC codes and 0 if not 






Dummy Variable: 1 when both the target and acquirer are 




                                                 
Loughran and Ritter (2004) define high-tech firms as firms in the following industry SIC codes: computer hardware (3571, 3572, 3575, 3577, 3578); 
communications equipment (3661, 3663, 3669); electronics (3671, 3672, 3674, 3675, 3677, 3678, 3679); navigation equipment (3812); measuring and 
controlling devices (3823, 3825, 3826, 3827, 3829); medical instruments (3841, 3845); telephone equipment (4812, 4813); communications services (4899); 






Full Correlation Matrix 
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**Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed) and *Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed). 
